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Shuko wins the first game of the 5th Kisei title match.

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The cover: Tadanobu dreaming of revenge at the go board, by the popular Meiji artist Chikanobu. Sato Tadanobu (1160 – 85) and his brother Tsuginobu were among the bodyguards of Minamoto Yoshitsune (1159 – 89) and both died in his cause. Tadanobu also appears on the covers of GW13.

Collection of William Pinckard.

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Fujisawa Shuko Leads Kisei Title Match

In what was expected to be his toughest Kisei title match so far, Fujisawa Shuko has once again surprised the go world by sweeping to an early three game lead over the challenger, Otake Hideo, in the 5th Kisei title match. While the first game was a one-sided win for Shuko, the second and third could have gone either way, yet somehow Shuko's sheer determination and fighting spirit enabled him to snatch victory from his opponent.

Shuko's strength in the Kisei tournament is rapidly becoming proverbial. After watching his performance in the first four title matches, one has no right to be surprised, but how many go fans expected him to start with three straight wins against an opponent of Otake's calibre? Every year Shuko seems to put a year's worth of go playing into this one title match and every year his skill and tenacity prove too much for players who on paper are his equals. One can only hope that Otake makes a recovery in the fourth game to give the series some interest. An additional incentive for Shuko is the fact that he will become eligible for the title of Honorary Kisei after he retires if he wins the title for five successive terms.

The results:

Game 1 (Jan. 13, 14). Fujisawa (W) won by resig.
Game 2 (Jan. 28, 29). Fujisawa (B) won by resig.
Game 3 (Feb. 4, 5). Fujisawa (W) won by resig.

Late news. The fourth game, played on the 18th and 19th February, was won by Shuko.

Hashimoto Shoji to Challenge Otake Judan

Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in has earned the right to challenge Otake Hideo for the 19th Judan title by defeating Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan in the playoff held on the 12th February. Hashimoto previously defeated Kobayashi in the final of the winners' section of the Judan tournament, then when the latter won the losers' section, triumphed again in the playoff between the two sections. Hashimoto won the 12th Judan title in 1974 and also unsuccessfully challenged Kato for the 17th title in 1979.

1981 Honinbo and Meijin Leagues

Cho Chikun Meijin seems to be having a determined crack at the Honinbo title, for he has made the best start in the 36th Honinbo league, with



Hashimoto Shoji

three straight wins. He is closely pursued by Rin Kaiho and Hashimoto Shoji, both with 3-1, while Kato is also in the running with 2-1. Kato is doing better in the 6th Meijin league, where he has taken the early lead with 3-0. However, at this early stage all nine members of the Meijin league still have to be considered in the running.

1981 European Go Congress

The 25th Jubilee Go Congress will be held in Linz in Austria from the 25th July to the 14th August this year. Events will include the European Championship, the Main Tournament, the Weekend Tournament (1st & 2nd August), lightning tournaments, a handicap tournament and the 13 x 13 European Championship (3rd - 7th August). Anyone interested in attending the tournament should contact:

Anton Steininger
Wienerstrasse 69
A-4010 Linz
Austria

The congress venue is:

Gastehaus 4040 Linz
Julius Raab Strasse

Israeli Go Association

Last year the Israeli Go Association was formed and the following activities are scheduled for 1981:

The Jerusalem Region Amateur Go Championship for 1981, beginning in January

36th Honinbo League (as of 12th February)

Rank	Name	K	R	S	C	H	S	H	S	Score
1	Kato	—				0	1		1	2 — 1
2	Rin		—	1	0		1	1		3 — 1
3	Sakata		0	—		0	1			1 — 2
4	Cho		1		—			1	1	3 — 0
5	Hashimoto S.	1		1		—	0		1	3 — 1
5	Shiraishi	0	0	0		1	—			1 — 3
5	Honda K.		0		0			—	0	0 — 3
5	Sakai	0			0	0		1	—	1 — 3

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

6th Meijin League (as of 12th February)

Rank	Name	O	K	T	R	K	S	Sh	Y	S	Score
1	Otake	—		1							1 — 0
2	Kato		—		1			1	1		3 — 0
3	Takemiya	0		—		1			1		2 — 1
4	Rin		0		—	1					1 — 1
5	Kobayashi			0	0	—	1				1 — 2
6	Sakata					0	—			1	1 — 1
7	Shimamura		0					—		0	0 — 2
7	Yamabe		0	0					—		0 — 2
7	Sato						0	1		—	1 — 1

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

The 2nd Annual All-Israel Amateur Go Championship, tentatively scheduled for March

The contact address is:

Ms. Yael Schetzer

Secretary, Israeli Go Association

P. O. B. 4144 Jerusalem

Go computer programming

A survey of the related literature

This book may be ordered for 25DM from Prof. Dr. K. Heine, Kleiststr. 67, 294 Wilhelmshaven, F. R. Germany

Proceedings of the 2nd Seminar of Scientific Go Theory (1979)

The proceedings of this seminar have been published as a 125 page book, thus surveying for the first time in print the state of go theory from various scientific aspects. The thirteen topics covered include:

The Rules and Algebraic Definitions

Mathematical and statistical aspects

Psychological, pedagogic and biological aspects

Oteai Promotions

Below are some of the promotions in the oteai session belatedly started in December.

To 7-dan: Yamashiro Hiroshi

To 6-dan: O Rissei, Izumitani Minoru

To 5-dan: Iwata Hajime

TV Haya-go

There are now five TV haya-go tournaments, so the top players are kept busy fitting the games into their tournament schedule. Here are some progress

scores.

The Haya-go Championship was won by Sakata Eio, who defeated Kato 2–1 in the playoff. Sakata has also reached the final of the Japan Asia Air Lines cup, where he will meet Otake Hideo. The largest and most prestigious TV tournament is the NHK Cup and here the final will be fought between Fujisawa Shuko and Takagi Shoichi 8-dan. The other tournament currently in progress is the Kakusei Tournament, which is sponsored by Japan Air Lines. This is a mini-league of five players and the result this year, a five-way tie for first, illustrates the main danger of these mini-leagues. Kato, Ishida, Otake, Fujisawa Shuko and Cho Chikun all ended on 2–2 and will have to start all over again, this time with a knockout tournament, to get a decision.

1980 Tournament Results and Statistics

The following list covers the main professional tournaments held in Japan last year.

February

4th Kisei: Fujisawa Shuko defeated Rin Kaiho 4–1

27th NHK Cup: Hashimoto Shoji

12th Haya-go Championship: Ishida Yoshio

2nd Kakusei Tournament: Kato Masao

March

2nd Japan Asia Airlines Cup: Sakata Eio

April

18th Judan: Otake defeated Kato Judan 3–2

5th Kisei, 7-dan section: Fukui Masaaki

May

26th Women's Honinbo: Ogawa Tomoko defeated Kobayashi Chizu 2–1

2nd Women's Kakusei: Suzuki Tsuna 3-dan

5th Kisei, 8-dan section: Cho Chikun

June

11th New Stars (TV): Awaji Shuzo 7-dan

July

35th Honinbo: Takemiya Masaki defeated Kato Honinbo 4–1

5th Kisei, 9-dan section: Sakata Eio

4th Shinjin-O: Miyazawa Goro 6-dan

August

5th Gosei: Otake defeated Cho Gosei 3–1

September

5th Kisei, Stage Two: Cho Chikun

October

24th Prime Minister's Cup: Fukui Masaaki 7-dan

21st Okan (Crown): Iwata Tatsuaki

November

5th Meijin: Cho Chikun defeated Otake Meijin 4–1–1 draw

28th Oza: Kato Oza defeated Ishida Yoshio 2–0

December

6th Tengen: Kato Tengen defeated Yamabe 3–0

5th Kisei, Stage Three final: Otake defeated Cho 2–1

Top Ten Prize-winners

1. Cho Chikun: ¥38,130,000

2. Kato Masao: ¥33,600,000

3. Fujisawa Shuko: ¥29,830,000

4. Otake Hideo: ¥25,550,000

5. Takemiya Masaki: ¥22,110,000

6. Rin Kaiho: ¥20,060,000

7. Sakata Eio: ¥17,180,000

8. Ishida Yoshio: ¥12,640,000

9. Kobayashi Koichi: ¥9,530,000

10. Yamashiro Hiroshi: ¥6,520,000

Cho Chikun did not quite reach the record of ¥40,200,000 set by Kato in 1978. Although the order is different, the same ten players topped the list in 1979 (see GW18, p. 4)

Highest number of wins (over 6-dan)

1. Cho Chikun: 38–19–1 draw

2. Sakata Eio: 35–19

3. Kobayashi Koichi: 32–15

4. Takemiya Masaki: 28–15

5. Ishida Yoshio: 27–18

6. Sato Masaharu: 25–9

Kato Masao: 25–18

Rin Kaiho: 25–22

9. Otake Hideo: 23–17–1 draw

10. Yamabe Toshiro: 22–7

Following, with 20 wins, are Takagi Shoichi, Kojima Takaho, Fukui Masaaki, Kudo Norio and Ishii Kunio. Just for reference, Fujisawa Shuko, with 13–12, came way down.

Best winning percentage (over 6-dan)

1. Yamabe: 75.9%

2. Sato Masaharu: 73.5%

3. Takagi: 71.4% (20–8)

4. Kojima: 69% (20–9)

5. Kobayashi Koichi: 68.1%

6. Cho Chikun: 66.7%

Shimamura Toshihiro: 66.7% (14–7)

8. Baba Shigeru 7-dan: 65.5% (19–10)

9. Sakai Takeshi 8-dan: 65.4% (17–9)

10. Takemiya: 65.1%


Cho Wins Shusai Prize

The 18th Shusai Prize for the outstanding player of the year was awarded to Cho Chikun by a unanimous vote of the committee. Fujisawa Shuko and Takemiya Masaki were also considered, but it was felt to be beyond doubt that 1980 was the year of Cho Chikun. Incidentally, in the three preceding years the prize was won by Kato.

Kido Prizes for 1980.


In its March 1981 issue, 'Kido' magazine announced that the 'Kido' prizes for 1980 were awarded as follows.

1. The outstanding player of the year: Cho Chikun
2. The highest number of wins (7-dan and up): Cho Chikun
3. Best winning percentage (minimum 30 games): Sato Masaharu. (Yamabe missed out because he only played 29 games.)
4. Most consecutive wins (7-dan and up): Yamabe (11 wins in a row)
5. The special merit prize: Fukui Masaaki 7-dan
6. The fighting spirit prize: Sato Masaharu
7. The prize for technique: Yamabe Toshiro
8. The outstanding woman player: Kobayashi Reiko (15 wins, 9 losses). Ogawa Tomoko, holder of the Women's Honinbo title, was ineligible because she did not have a plus record for the year.
9. The 'new face' prize: Ito Yoji 5-dan (33-9)
10. Special women's prize: Suzuki Tsuna




Michael Redmond Becomes Professional Shodan

Michael Redmond, aged seventeen, of Santa Barbara, California, has assured himself of pro-



(1 - 100) 93: ko



(101 - 164) Black resigns
White: Redmond; Black: Maeda

motion to professional shodan in the annual insei tournament at the Nihon Ki-in. With nine wins to three losses, Michael is at present in third place in the sixteen-member round robin tournament, but he has secured promotion regardless of the results of his three remaining games. Michael will thus become the third western professional, but the first to earn promotion through the insei tournament. In our next issue, we will give one of his games with a commentary, but to go on with, his game from the third round is given above.

Incidentally, the current leader of the tournament, on 11-1, is Fujisawa Shuko's fifth son, Kazunari (aged sixteen).

The 3rd World Amateur Go Championship
10th – 14th March 1981
The Nihon Ki-in, Tokyo

Thirty-two players from twenty-four countries will participate in this tournament. There will be the usual strong Asian contingent, but players from other parts of the world have demonstrated that they are a force to be reckoned with and should figure among the place-getters. The line-up this year is given below, headed by the guest officials on the tournament committee.

Members of the tournament committee

Japan: Yoshikuni Ichiro
China: Wang Ru-nang
Korea: Kim In (pro. 8-dan)
Europe: Anton Steininger
North America: David Relson
Oceania: John Hardy
South America: Tokio Arikawa




Murakami Bunsho



Kamekura Yoshiko

Contestants

Hong Kong: Tsang Ping-fai
Japan: Hirata Hironori, Murakami Bunsho, Kamekura Yoshiko
China: Liu Xiao-guang, Ma Xiao-chung (at 16, the youngest competitor), Shao Zhen-zhong
Korea: Moon Il-doo, Park Sang-don, Park Yoon-suh
Philippines: Sychingson Johnson
Austria: Helmut Wiltschek
Czechoslovakia: Milan Kochandrlle
Denmark: Dix Sandbeck
Germany: Jurgen Mattern
France: Andre Moussa
Hungary: Karoly Vekey
Holland: Robert Rehm
Poland: Janusz Kraszek
Spain: Juan Garcia de la Banda
Sweden: Per-Inge Olsson
Switzerland: Patrice Gosteli




Peter Gaspari




Patrice Gosteli




Liu Xiao-guang



Shao Zhen-zhong



Ron Snyder



Per-Inge Olsson

U. K.: Matthew Macfadyen, Terence Stacey
Yugoslavia: Peter Gaspari
Canada: Keiji Shimizu
U. S. A.: Ron Snyder, Hai-chow Chen
Australia: John Chen
New Zealand: Barry Phease
Argentina: Eduardo Lopez Herrero
Brazil: Minoru Taniguchi
(Note: Names of competitors from Japan, China and Korea are given with the family name first.)

A new departure in go publishing

THE KISEIDO PUBLISHING COMPANY

announces the forthcoming publication of

INVINCIBLE

THE GAMES OF SHUSAKU

Compiled, edited and translated by John Power

A definitive collection of the best games of one of the greatest go players in history, with detailed commentaries by top modern professional players and a full description of the historical background.

Shusaku (1829 – 62), ‘the invincible’, was the outstanding player in an age of go geniuses. In the annual castle games (O-shiro-go), participation in which was severely restricted to the top players of the day, thus making it the highest honour open to a go player, Shusaku set an unprecedented record of nineteen straight wins over a period of thirteen years, a feat without parallel in the two hundred and fifty year history of the castle games. He was also victorious in every important match he played and, in what was the golden age of go, he firmly established his preeminence. His tragic death at the age of thirty-three was an enormous blow to the go world.

Shusaku also made great contributions to the development of go theory. His famous ‘Shusaku style’ fuseki pattern laid the foundations of modern fuseki theory and is still popular today. In Japan his games are considered exemplary and are required study for all serious students of go. In fact, the first task invariably assigned to would-be professionals or insei is to go through his complete games. Go Seigen is one example of a famous player who studied Shusaku thoroughly in his formative period.

This book gives a unique and detailed insight into the world of nineteenth century Japanese go. Apart from the castle games mentioned above, highlights include:

Shusaku’s precocious triumph over Gennan Inseki, the arch-enemy of the Honinbo house. Their series produced the most famous move in go history, ‘the ear-reddening move of Shusaku’.

All the games from the famous twenty-three game series in which Shusaku finally defeated his main rival, Ota Yuzo.

Shusaku’s games with his teacher, Shuwa, the 14th Honinbo, which contain some of the most interesting and subtle go of the period.

And many others, amounting in all to over seventy games with detailed commentary, together with an additional selection of about a hundred of his best games.

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5th Meijin Title

Game Three

Black: Otake Hideo, Meijin

White: Cho Chikun, 8-dan

komi: 5½

October 1–2 at Izu Nagaoka

Commentary by Rin Kaiho, 9-dan





Figure 1 (1 – 22)

Figure 1 (1 – 22)

Black's high enclosure at 5 is slightly unusual. After White 12, however, the extension to 21 becomes more valuable than if Black had made a conventional small knight's enclosure, so Black 5 may be more efficient.

If White had answered Black 17 with the diagonal move at 1 in Dia. 1, Black intended



Dia. 1

to continue with 2 to 8. If he exchanged 2 for 3 before making the triangled pincer, White would not oblige by answering at 1. White's forcing at 18 and extending wide to 20 were thus the natural flow of the game.

Black 21 was a good move, one which Black had already planned when he made the high en-




Figure 2 (23 – 48)

closure at 5. White 22 was a calm response, maintaining the balance of territory.

Figure 2 (23 – 48)

In answer to Black 23, White's forcing at 24 and extending to 26 seem correct. The diagonal attachment at 24 is usually avoided because it strengthens Black, but in this case, if Black continues by defending the left side, the best he can do is make a two-space extension to 28, so White may as well force at 24.

Black 27 made miai of defending at 28 and invading at 33.


Otake was apparently unhappy with Black 29 and 31 because they went onto neutral points, but considering the value of the invasion at 33, I don't think these moves can be criticized. Of course Black could defend with 27 at 28, let White extend to 'a', then make a shoulder hit at 'b', but that would be another game.

White 30 could not be omitted, or else Black would invade at 'c' and deprive the entire white group of its base.

Black's invasion at 33 came according to plan. White's answering probe at 34 was natural, in view of the narrow extension Black had made to ▲. The ensuing moves through 39 were a forced sequence.

Black's thrust at 41 was the strongest resistance to White's contact play at 40, and once it had been made, the sequence through 47 followed automatically.

White 48 was apparently too greedy. Cho said that he should have played 1 in Dia. 2, and I agree. White does not want to surround territory on too small a scale, because Black can hane and connect ('a-b-c') in sente, but White 1 seems just right.



Dia. 2





Figure 3 (49 - 73)


Figure 3 (49 - 73)

Black 49, the sealed move that ended the first day, took immediate advantage of White's overplay at 49. For White, choosing an attack on this group is not easy.

If Black answered White's peep at 50 by simply connecting at 1 in Dia. 3, White could



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

confine him with 2 and 4. This looks grim for Black. He therefore made the counter-peep at 51, and White connected at 52. If White had pushed through at 1 in Dia. 4, Black could thrust

at 4 and 6. The shape may be a little bad, but Black cannot be captured.

It was not impossible for Black to connect at 'a' with 55. An amateur might have done so out of fighting spirit, but —




Dia. 5

Dia. 5 If Black connects at 1, White will make the diagonal contact play at 2. Black must then jump to 3. After containing Black at 4, White has good prospects in the game.

Otake, however, seized this opportunity to open hostilities at 55. Here you see his skill. Looking at Dia. 5, if Black peeps at 'a' and White replies at 'b'; Black can then play 1 and 3, because after White 4 there is still a gap at 'c'. This would be unpleasant for White. Cho therefore fought straight back by connecting at 56, precipitating the first crisis of the game.

Black 57, 59, and 61 cut White clean in two. Black could not directly answer White 62, or White would push at 65, then attack at 73. Black 63, however, caused White trouble enough. His territorial framework had been broken up and his four stones on the right were in danger of being captured.

White 72, in the midst of these troubles, was a steel-nerved move. If Black carelessly answered by cutting at 1 in Dia. 6, White would cut in return at 4, and Black would come out on the losing end of this exchange of cuts. White's isolated group can live with White 'a', followed by White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'. Black's thick reply at 73 removed this threat.



Dia. 6





Figure 4 (74 - 101)

Figure 4 (74 - 101)

Otake attempted to answer one forcing move (White 74) with another at 75. Black 75 feels good, picking up points in the corner and threatening to cut with 'a-b-c', but I think it would have been simpler for Black to jump to 79 and definitely capture the five white stones. Black was alive even without 75, because if White played 75, Black could respond with 'd-e-f' in sente. Of course 75 kept Black well in the lead, but it gave White a chance to start trouble with 76.

About Black 83, Cho said that he would have liked it less if Black had connected at 86 and captured the four white stones on the right, a sentiment with which I concur.

Black's ponnuki at 89 was a terrible mistake. Black had to connect first at 1 in Dia. 7, trading this for White 2, then capture at 3. If White answered Black 1 by coming out at 3, then Black



Dia. 7

'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', followed by perhaps Black 'e' would make life extremely difficult for White's large group. There was no reason for Black to rush to capture at 89. White's cutting at 92 was huge; it reversed the lead. Black could still push through and cut with 'g-h-i', but only at the cost of losing territory to the right, so this cut was not much to aim at.

Black 99 and 101 were valueless moves. At this point Black was no longer just attacking White; he was trying to capture him. The fact that Black had to resort to such tactics suggests the difficult position he was in.




Figure 5 (102 - 151)


24: connects

Figure 5 (102 - 151)


White played 2, forced with 4, 6, and 8, then captured at 10, using the cover of confusion to eliminate the threats of Black 'a' and 'b' and expecting to save his large group in a two-on-one confrontation.

White 36 was a sharp cut. Cho had been in byo-yomi since White 2, and his reading of this move in just one minute was quite a feat.

But he finally slipped at White 40. If he had played 1 in Dia. 8 and linked up with 5, the game would have been over. Cho said he was counting on winning the capturing race in Dia. 9, but this capturing race seems to end with White a move




Dia. 8



Dia. 9

behind, so he changed plans at White 42.

White 48 was the final mistake. If White had played 1 and so on in Dia. 10, ending with the



Dia. 10

extension to 11, the game would have been close, in fact, I think White would have had a win. White 48 appears to have been based on a miscalculation.




Figure 6 (152 - 209)
79: connects at 64; ko: 90, 93

Figure 6 (152 - 209)

Having his left-side group captured by Black 55 and 57 made White's defeat certain. The rest of the moves were just played to see what would happen. At the end, after Black 109, although White can cut at 'a', the lettered sequence that follows (in which White connects at 109 and 'g') leaves Black with more than enough liberties to capture the white group above.

In this game, Otake began the fighting in masterful fashion with 49 in the early middle game and built up a substantial lead, only to see it collapse due to the hasty ponnuki at 89. Then White, in turn, threw away his lead with mistakes at 140 and 148. It was a good, hard-fought game, but it shows what can happen when you let slip chances to pin down victory.

White resigns at Black 209.

Game Four

Black: Cho Chikun, 8-dan

White: Otake Hideo, Meijin

(The following account is translated from a report by a Nihon Kiin go writer who writes under the pseudonym of Hotta Gobanshi.)

The night of October 9th: strange currents are loose in the air in a hotel annex in the city of Gifu where the endgame of the 5th Meijin title game is in progress. The stones are flying. In the midst of byo-yomi, a dramatic reversal of the lead has taken place. Through a series of mistakes, Otake has just destroyed an advantage he had built up with brilliant defensive play in the middle game, and Cho is on his way to victory.

Eight people are in the playing room. Besides the two players there are Ishida Yoshio 9-dan, the official referee; Hikosaka Naoto 4-dan, the recorder; three representatives of the sponsoring Asahi newspaper; and I. Both players are in one-minute byo-yomi, and the game has entered a ko fight. At about 10:40 p. m. Otake makes a ko threat with White 210. Cho answers it. Otake takes the ko. The reading of time begins. At the 40-second mark Cho, his eyes bloodshot from fatigue, turns to the recorder.

'My turn to take the ko?'

'Yes.'

Before anyone else can utter a word, Cho reaches out and breaks the rules by taking the

ko. He has not made a ko threat.

A special regulation established for the Meijin title matches states that, 'In the event of any accidental or doubtful occurrence, the referee shall take appropriate action after consultation with the Asahi newspaper. The players shall abide by the referee's decision.' Ishida and the newspaper representatives retire to an adjoining room. They are gone for about half an hour. When they come back, the verdict is 'mushobu' — the game is considered to have ended without result.

The reasons are explained. The players are customarily allowed to ask the recorder if it is their turn to take a ko. There is no question that the recorder answered, 'Yes,' hence the referee's decision. The players accept the decision, and we shall now look at the game.






Figure 1 (1 - 50)
22 at 4



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 50. A brilliant move, which Otake thought about for two hours. White would like to give atari at 1 in Dia. 1, then contain Black with 3, 5, and 7, but that fails as shown. (Note that it would work if Black had played 47 at 48.) If Black answers White 50 with 1 in Dia. 2, however, White can settle both his groups with the sequence through 20. If Black plays 17 at 18, White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' captures him.




Figure 2 (51 - 104)
87: connects

Figure 2 (51 - 104)

White 60. A clever peep.

White 74 sets up a beautiful squeeze.

White 92 sandwiches Black's group against White's thick wall. The game is starting to move in White's direction.

Figure 3 (105 - 191)

Black 9-13. When he decided to sacrifice his three stones in the center, Cho may have overlooked the way White could live in the top right corner.

White 14 and 16. White takes the lead.

White 46, Black 47. This exchange helps the top right corner, but hurts the top left, because White 62 becomes gote. White should therefore have protected the top left by playing 54 at 62. Had he done so, the game would have stood as a masterpiece for him.

White 68. Otake played this stone with such force that it bounced Black 67 off the board. It also nearly cost him the game. If he had cut at 70, he would still have been ahead. When




Figure 3 (105 - 191)

ko: 88, 91

Black lived with 69 through 75, the lead changed hands.

White 82. If at 83, Black escapes with 'a'. White 82 made the ko inevitable.




Figure 4 (192 - 213)

ko: 97, 100, 103, 106, 109, 112, 113.

Figure 4 (192 - 213)

White 98 and 104 lose points, but White is desperate for ko threats.

Black 111 was not necessary. Black could have connected at 94 and won. However, he still had plenty of ko threats, while White was nearly out. If the game had continued, Otake would probably have soon resigned.

The game ends without result at Black 113.

The outcome of this game was reported on

late news broadcasts and in the morning papers, and the next day the Nihon Ki-in and the Asahi newspaper were deluged with inquiries and protests. The main opinions were that:

(1) Cho should have lost on violation of the rules.

(2) The players were placing too much responsibility on the shoulders of the recorder.

(3) Black 213 should have been retracted and the game continued.

Some people also commented on the behavior of the referee. The intensity of the reaction testifies to the semi-religious awe in which amateur go players hold professionals, and the purity they expect of professional competition.

After this game, the Nihon Ki-in quickly restudied the Meijin tournament regulations and added a clarification that the recorder 'is not responsible for the players' moves.' In other words, the next time such an incident occurred, the offending player would lose, regardless of the recorder's answer. It was also ruled that this game would stand in the records and that if the seven-game series ended in a 3-3 tie, an eighth game would be played to decide it.

Some fans questioned Cho's right to ask the recorder about the ko in the first place, but this right is guaranteed by custom. To estimate the territory, read out various moves, and choose one in the bare minute allowed by byo-yomi is no easy task. When a ko arises, the player must also count ko threats and evaluate the exchanges that might result from the ko. His mind is in a state of near frenzy. In a major title match he has already been under the strain of nearly 20 hours of intense combat. Anyone would want to ask the recorder. There have been cases in past Meijin title matches when the recorder was asked. I cannot judge whether this custom is good or bad, nor can I reply to those who remarked that, 'High-ranking professional players should take responsibility for their own moves,' but I can state that in any professional game, the players are operating at the limits of human capability.

In view of the fact that the incident took place during byo-yomi, Ishida probably did the only think he could do. Fortunately the players acquiesced in his decision, and no ill feelings disturbed the rest of the series.

(Translated by James Davies)

Game Five

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Otake Hideo

date: 22nd, 23rd October, 1980

played at La Foret Shuzenji in Izu

Commentary by Rin Kaiho 9-dan




Figure 1 (1 – 40)

Figure 1 (1 – 40). White loses the initiative.


White 2–8. White is clearly settling down for a slow-paced game. Black tries to speed up the pace by invading at 13. Black 'a'—White 25—Black 21 would be more leisurely.

White 14 is a slack move which makes the game difficult for White. Black gets excellent forcing moves at 15 and 17, after which he is able to switch to 21. He does not have to worry about his group because he can settle it any time by playing 23. Instead of 14 —


Dia. 1. White should play at 1; after the exchange to 4, the invasion at 5 would be severe. The white stones would outnumber the black stones six to three in this sector of the board, so the fight would have to be advantageous for White.

White 22 is the only move. Next, Black settles his group with 23, according to plan. If Black secures all his other groups, leaving himself with only one weak position (Black 9), he will have no trouble coping with an attack by White, since White will not be able to contrive a double attack. Instead of 22 —


Dia. 2. If White plays 1 to stop Black from securing his group at the bottom, Black takes sente with 2, then settles his group on the side with 4. This would nicely simplify the game for Black.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

White 30. Cho probably also considered White 1 in Dia. 3. If Black 2, White would jump to 3, threatening the black stone below while also aiming at the invasion at 'a' at the top. This seems more aggressive than the sequence in the game, though one cannot say which is better.

When Black secures his group at the top with 31 to 35, all that is left for White is to attack the solitary black stone on the side. In short, the game has become monotonous because of White's mistake with 14.

When White caps at 36, Black welcomes the chance to clarify the status of his group with 37 and 39. He is not afraid of the attack at 40.




Figure 2 (41 - 65)

Figure 2 (41 - 65). An ineffective attack

White's attack with 42 looks good, but Black has no trouble escaping. The sequence to 50 is forced. If White plays 46 at 1 in Dia. 4 (previous page), he can capture a few black stones, but he loses his corner group.


Black 51. Rin: 'Black 51 was played to save face for Black 43. I would prefer to extend towards the centre with 1 in Dia. 5. If White 2, Black links up with 3 and 5. White 'a' looks dangerous, but Black can handle it with 'b'. If White plays 2 and 4 in Dia. 6 to prevent Black from linking up, then after White 6, Black moves out with 7 to 11. Both diagrams would be reasonable for Black.'

Black 55. The sealed move.


Black 57, securing a base on the side, looks natural, but again Rin disagreed. Rin: 'Linking up with 1 etc. in Dia. 7 would still be safer. This looks painful, as Black is just playing on dame points, but linking up means separating the opponent. White would probably continue with 6 to 12, whereupon Black could jump to 13, aiming at the hane at 'a'. I think that playing this way would have been better.'

Black 59. The timid answer at 1 in Dia. 8 would be bad, as White would build central influence with 2 to 6. Black 59 to 65 are the strongest counter to White's attack. After 65, White seems to be in trouble, for he has no direct continuation at the top. The standard tesuji is White 1 in Dia. 9, but here it is not satisfactory.


Dia. 9. If Black 2, White cuts at 3. White 5 makes miai of capturing the two stones on the




Dia. 5




Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

outside with the ladder at 'a' and capturing the stones on the side with 7. However, Black would gladly give up two stones for the privilege of making a 'kame no ko' (tortoise shell) capture with 6 and 8. This would destroy White's prospects of making something of the centre.





Figure 3 (66 - 100)



Dia. 10

Figure 3 (66 - 100). White takes the lead.

White has no continuation at the centre top, but with 66 and 68 he attempts to conjure up an attack out of thin air. Black falls for the trick with 69. Otake did not approach this move with sufficient deliberation. Instead of 69 -


Dia. 10. If Black ignored White in order to capture two stones with 1, he would be virtually assured of a win. White could continue with 4 in the corner, but since living in the corner with 10 at 11 would give Black too much outside influence, he would play for an exchange instead with 10 to 13. Next, White 14 would be the best move for reducing the bottom right corner, but Black would be able to take sente and switch to the large point of 19. The main part of the game would be over, but with seventy points of territory

to White's forty, Black would have a runaway win.


The interesting point, however, is that when Otake played 69, no one noticed that it was a mistake. A number of professionals, headed by Rin, were following the game in another room of the hotel, but they were puzzled by White's play, for they could see no way for him to get a reasonable result at the top.

Black 75 is correct. Instead -

Dia. 11. If Black 1, White plays 2 and 4, leaving him with a ko in the corner, beginning with White 'a'. It is now hard for Black to find a good continuation. If he plays aggressively, pushing up at 5, White cuts at 6, setting up the extension at 8. If Black 9, White blocks at 10. White now threatens the combination of White 'b' and White 'c' and attacking at 'd' at the top (if Black 'e', 'f' puts White ahead in the semeai), so Black collapses. However, if Black plays 9 at 'b', White hanes at 9, getting a superb squeeze.




Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Rin: 'After Black 75, White 76 and 78 are the only moves. I knew that, but I thought White had no answer to Black 79. Taking three stones with White 1 in Dia. 12 would be little different from Dia. 9, as Black captures at 2.'

White 80 is the move which no one else noticed; it is a blind spot because after Black 79 White cannot get a ladder (with 90), so escaping from atari seems pointless. It is an indication of Cho's flexibility that he saw past the conventional tesuji shown in Dia. 9; instead of limiting himself to the fight at the top Cho conceived the




Dia. 13


idea of attacking the black stones to the left.

Black 81. If at 1 in Dia. 13, Black will lose the semeai at the top after 12. The continuation to 95 in the figure is therefore forced and the result is a great success for White. In return for the sacrifice of a few stones at the top (captured very inefficiently by Black), he captures three black stones on the left and also builds up impressive central thickness. This is enough to put him in the lead.

Black 97. An emergency measure — answering peacefully with 1 and 3 in Dia. 14 would only let White consolidate his territorial lead.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Figure 4 (101 – 130). Tesuji and counter-tesuji

Black 1. Painful but necessary. Black has to be patient now in the hope that he can attack later.

White 2 is correct. Since it is obvious that Black will play 3 next, it would be tempting to play 2 there, but then White's centre position would be dangerously weakened by Black 'a'.

Black 15 is the counterattack Black has been aiming at. If White answers with 1 in Dia. 15, Black will be able to break through into the centre with the sequence to 8. White therefore must give atari on the other side, at 16.

Black 21 is also forced: Black cannot block at 1 in Dia. 16.

Dia. 16. White counters with 2 and 4, then attaches at 6. If Black 7, Black has no answer to






Figure 4 (101 – 130)



Dia. 16



Dia. 17

White 8. Instead of 7 —

Dia. 17. If Black 1 here, White plays 2 and 4 as preparation for wedging in at 6. Whatever happens, Black cannot save his key cutting stones.

Instead of 21, Black could capture the three white stones making a bamboo joint at 'b', but that would leave White with a large hane at 21, so White would be satisfied to switch to 'c' at the top. Black would have no prospect of being able to give the komi. In other words, Black has to do better than just capturing three stones. Thus, he plays aggressively with 21, aiming at Black 'd' or 'e'.

White 22. As he played this move, Cho muttered to himself: 'Never seen a move like this. Could such a move work?' In fact, however, White 22 was an exquisite tesuji, Cho's riposte to Black 15 and the move which ensured him of victory.

Black 23 is necessary. When White pushes through with 24, the continuation to 30 is forced, leading to a struggle which will decide the game. The point of White 22 will become clear in the next figure.




Figure 5 (131 - 160)

Figure 5 (131 - 160). *The meaning of White's tesuji*

Black 31. If Black connects at 1 in Dia. 18, White will cut at 2. A swap would then be inevitable, with White capturing five centre stones with 8 but losing his corner group after Black 9. However, Black ends in gote, so White is able to take the key point of 10. Black would have trouble winning on the board, let alone giving the komi.


Dia. 18 represents the unprofessional way of losing, that is, 'losing without doing anything'. With 31, Otake chooses to lose the professional way. He cannot expect a favourable result, but at least there is an outside chance of pulling off something.

When White cuts at 32, the continuation is again forced. The white group at the bottom does not have eyes, but when White strikes at the vital point of 34, Black's group does not have eyes either. A semeai cannot be avoided.


White 38. The meaning of White 22 in the previous figure now becomes clear, as Black is unable to take away the eyes of White's corner group. If he does try to, White plays White 54—Black 55—White 'a' and on the contrary it is Black who is captured. In other words, Black cannot answer White 54 at 55 because of White 22 in Figure 4. Without the 22—23 exchange there—

Dia. 19. Black takes away White's eyes with 1 and 3 and can safely answer White 4 at 5.


In effect, White 22 in Figure 4 guarantees life for White's corner group. Consequently, Black has no choice but to fight a semeai with the



Dia. 18



Dia. 19



Dia. 20

other white group with 39 etc.

White 50. A calm move which aims at attacking from the rear. Instead of 50—

Dia. 20. Attacking with 1 and 3 would be the worst way for White to play. White would lose the semeai after Black 4 and 6.

Black 53 makes it possible for Black to answer 54 at 55, but White does not add a move in the corner. Instead, he forces with 56 and 58, then makes a ponnuki at 60. This amounts to a declaration of victory.

Figure 5 (161 - 192). *An unwinnable ko*

Black 61. If at 1 in Dia. 21, Black cannot connect at 3, as White wins the semeai unconditionally





Figure 6 (161 - 192)
ko: 71, 86, 89, 92



Dia. 21


with 4. Black 61 and 63 reduce White to one eye, but again Black cannot connect after White 64, so the semeai becomes a ko. Conveniently for White, however, he has already eliminated some of Black's potential ko threats with his ponnuki at 60 in the previous figure, so Black does not have enough ko threats to win the ko.

White 70. White could of course cut at 85, but he prefers not to give Black extra ko threats. Provided that he wins the ko, he can afford to give up all his centre territory.

Black 73. Black is attempting to create ko threats big enough to enable him to fight the ko at the bottom left, but the task is hopeless. Otake was probably just looking for a suitable moment to resign.

White 84 is another move which, like White 60 in Figure 5, keeps White one step ahead strategically. If Black played 1 and 3 in Dia. 22 and White lived with 2 to 6, Black would be able to get ko threats at 'a' and 'b' etc. However, when White links up with 88, Black cannot get any threats here, so he has no chance of winning the ko. With 84, Black's last hope is dashed.

Black resigns after White 192.



Dia. 22

Time taken. White: 8 hours 57 minutes
Black: 6 hours 58 minutes
(*'Kido'*, December 1980)

Game Six

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Cho Chikun

date: 5th, 6th November, 1980; played at Atami

Commentary by Cho Chikun Meijin





Figure 1 (1 - 10)

Figure 1 (1 - 10). An unusual move

Black 7 looks ordinary, but it is in fact quite unusual. Cho: 'Playing in the top left, at 1 in Dia. 1 (next page), is the usual move, but after White 2 and 4, White would have the pressing move at 'a' in the top right, so Black would be reluctant to start a fight with Black 'b'—White




Dia. 1


'c' or to press at 'd'. Even though it permits White to enclose the corner with 10, I preferred to play 7.'

Otake agreed with Cho's analysis and praised his intuitive feel for the fuseki.


Cho: 'If one were to play here, the move would be the high approach at 1 in Dia. 2, but the continuation to 7 makes Black biased too much to the left side, so he would fall a little behind overall.'



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Figure 2 (11 – 40). White develops rapidly.

Black 11. Black realises that White will invade at 12, as White cannot permit him to defend first with 17, which would make excellent shape. If Black wanted to prevent the invasion, he could play 11 at 23, in which case White would play at 'a'.

White 14. If White 1 in Dia. 3, Black will play 2 and 4. A ko would follow with White 5 and 7, so Black would force with 8, then start the ko with 10. Black 'a' and 'b' would be sufficient compensation if White took and connected the ko.

Black 21. A well-timed move which indirectly defends against White 37. Black is satisfied with forcing White to defend at 22. Instead of 21 –





Figure 2 (11 – 40)

Dia. 4. If Black simply blocks at 1, White will play 2 and 4 and Black will be hard put to find a continuation. This would give a leisurely game, which would be uninteresting for Black.

White 24. Building thickness at the top with 34 is the honte (proper move). However, Black 25, which is overly concerned with attacking White's eye-shape, fails to take full advantage of White's omission.

Cho: 'Instead of 25, I should have forced with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5, then attached at 5. If White 6, Black pulls back at 7 and has superior overall thickness.'




Dia. 5


White 26. White 34 is better.

Black 33. Black should play 1 and 3 in Dia. 6. Black can play 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c' in sente, as White has to live with 'd'. Actually Cho was suffering from a hallucination about White 34. For some reason he assumed that White would play at 1 in Dia. 7, in which case he could build up the right side with 2 and 4.

Since Black made the last mistake, the end result is that White takes a slight lead when he switches to the large points of 38 and 40.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7





Figure 3 (41 - 76)




Dia. 8


Figure 3 (41 - 76). Mistake in timing

Black 47 is a natural counterattack. One might expect Black to answer automatically with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8, but Cho comments that this would be too depressing. White 4 would force Black 5, after which the ▲ stone would be completely superfluous. That would be unbearable.

White 50 invites a cut. Black in turn has to attack strongly to make up for letting White break



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

into the right side with 46 and 48.

White 58. The best move here was White 1 in Dia. 9.

Dia. 9. If Black cuts with 2 and 4, White gets thickness with 5 to 11. If Black attacks with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White can always live with White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f'. Instead of 1 —


Dia. 10. White 1 here is not very good, as Black builds thickness with 2 and 4. After the continuation to 9, the white group is floating eyeless.

White 60 was the sealed move. Although Otake spent fifty-seven minutes on it, he confessed later that he was mainly thinking about his carelessness with 58. Incidentally, Otake made the sealed move in every game of the series.

White 72, 74. A mistake in order, according to Otake, as White should play 74 first.

Dia. 11 (next page). If White pushes at 1 first, Black will answer at 2, so White could then exchange 3 for 4. Next, White 5 would stabilise his group; since White is threatening 'a' or 'b' on the side, it would be difficult for Black to resist in the centre.

Because White played 72 and 74 in the wrong order, Black was able to ignore 74 and swallow up White's stone with 75. White 72 is thus trans-



Dia. 11

formed into a bad move which destroys aji, while White is no longer able to attach at 'a' with 76, as Black is too strong on the right.





Figure 4 (77 - 131)

Figure 4 (77 - 131). White recovers.


Black keeps White separated with 79 etc., so White has to attach at 82 in order to link up. The drawback is that White is just playing on dame points, so Black's attack is working well. It bears tangible fruit when Black blocks at 91.

Black 93. Cho regretted that he did not simply play at 'a', as White 94 and 98 made his bottom left corner vulnerable.


Black 107. Black has no choice. If he attempts to capture White by blocking at 1 in Dia. 12, White will play 2 to 8 to extend his liberties, then counterattack by cutting at 10. The continuation



Dia. 12



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

7: connects

is shown in Dia. 13.

Dia. 13. The result is a ko, but if Black loses it, he will be completely wiped out in this area. Black 1 in Dia. 12 is therefore unreasonable.


The result to 110 is good for White and puts him right back in the game.

White 112. White 'b' on the left would also be a good move, but 112 is more urgent.

White 118 is a clever response to 115 and 117. If Black captures 118 with 1 in Dia. 14, White will force with 2 to 6, then use the support of this thickness to devastate the centre with 8 to 12.

White 122 is a patient move. Cho half expected Otake to invade around 'c', so he was relieved at getting the chance to reinforce with 125. Invading would now be unreasonable for White. After 129, Cho felt that the game was promising for him.

Black 131 is a mistake, as Black should expand his centre with 1 in Dia. 15. If White attacks with 2, Black 3 makes miai of 4 and 5, so Black is not in any trouble. Following this diagram would have secured Black's lead.



Dia. 15





Figure 5 (132 - 175)

Figure 5 (132 - 175). Some bad moves and some good ones


Black 33, White 34. Both sides are making mistakes. Instead of 33, Black should play 1 and 3 in Dia. 16. Instead of 2 -

Dia. 17. If White resists with 2, he collapses after Black 3 to 9. Black 'a' and 'b' are miai.



Dia. 16


Dia. 17



Dia. 18

Instead of 34, White should answer at 1 in Dia. 18. Black can force with 2, but he can no longer attach at 1 in Dia. 16. Compared with Dia. 18, White 34 represents a loss of nearly three points. Although both sides went wrong here, the one making the last mistake of course suffers more. Cho went into the lead again.

Black 57. Cho had at first intended to cut at 1 in Dia. 19, but he realised just in time that that would be dangerous.




Dia. 19

Dia. 20

Dia. 19. White forces with 2 to 6, then plays 8 and 10. Black is in trouble: if Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', then White cuts at 'd'.

White 64. A clever move which exploits the fact that White 'a' would be sente against the corner. Cho was taken by surprise and his calculations were upset, because he had been expecting the sequence in Dia. 20.



Dia. 21


6: ko (below 3)

Black 67 is forced. If Black blocks at 1 in Dia. 21, White counters with 2 to 6, then attaches at 8. Next -

Dia. 22. White gets a ko with 10 and 12.


White 68 is also superbly timed. At this point Black has no choice about answering at 69, so White can take some points later with 80 etc. in the next figure. According to Cho, he ended up getting three points less than he had calculated on the right side. Otake's brilliant yose had made the game even again.

White 70. Otake commented that he should have followed Dia. 23 (next page). White 1 would set up the continuation of White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', thus making two points of territory here.



Dia. 22

In the game Otake was more concerned with preventing Black 'd' from being sente.



Dia. 23




Figure 6 (176 - 205)

86: takes two stones; 87: recaptures

Figure 6 (176 - 205). The losing move

White 76. Worth a good five points in reverse sente.


White 80 and 82, forestalling Black 'a', are big. However, Black 85 is small: if Black lost, this would be the losing move. Instead of 85, Black should cut at 97.

White 88 is the losing move. If instead White played 1 and 3 in Dia. 24, the game would be very close and White would have an excellent chance of winning. Cho and Otake later worked out the yose after this diagram and came to the conclusion that White would have won by half a point.

Black does not give White a second chance. He forces with 89 to 95, then cuts at 97. The continuation to 105 decides the game.

Figure 7 (206 - 247). A new Meijin

Black should have won by just half a point, but



Dia. 24





Figure 7 (206 - 247)

26: ko (at 18); 44: connects (at 23)

Black wins and connects the ko.



Dia. 25

White 34 increased his winning margin. The correct yose is shown in Dia. 25.

Dia. 25. White 1 is the correct move. Black 2 is

necessary to prevent White from getting two points with White 2, Black 'a', White 'b'. The sequence to 12 would follow, after which both sides would connect ko, giving Black a half point win.

Black wins by 1½ points.

Time taken. White: 6 hours 47 minutes

Black: 8 hours 57 minutes

Cho's win in this game gave him the series four wins to one loss, with one game drawn. Thus, after winning seven lesser titles, Cho had finally achieved his ambition to win the big one. 'Finally' may seem a strange word to use of a twenty-four year old, but it is appropriate in Cho's case, for after coming to Japan as a six year old, Cho made a vow that he would not make a trip home to Korea until he had won the Meijin title. He thus had to wait eighteen years.

When Cho made his first trip home, at the New Year, he was greeted as a national hero and he received a decoration from President Chun, who is a keen go-player. During his visit, Cho played two games with the Korean champion, Cho Hun Hyen, who regularly monopolises all the Korean professional titles. One was a serious two-day game (nine hours per player), which Cho Chikun won by 3½ points, while the other was a TV haya-go, which he won, by 5½ points.

The January issue of 'Kido' featured an in-depth review of Cho's career, including some impressive statistics. Since he came to Japan up to the end of 1980, Cho had played a total of 573 games as a professional and of these has won 415 or 72%. The breakdown of these game is as follows:

oteai: 83 wins, 22 losses, 2 jigo

other tournaments: 332 wins, 135 losses, 1 draw

Of special interest is an article, translated below, which 'Kido' requested Cho to write about his go style.



My Go Cho Chikun Meijin

You are asking me to write about my go?

My go is not something splendid, to be displayed in the toko-no-ma (alcove) or framed on the wall, I have no pretensions at all to splendour. I am only too aware of how far I still have to go.


I do not think very much about what my go is like or what kind of player I want to be. People have made comments to me about my go style and I have tried thinking about it myself, but the person concerned is probably the last one to really understand himself.

So, let's write about other people.

When I was a child, Inoue Kunio (6-dan, a fellow Kitani disciple) liked Honinbo Shuwa and often studied him. Under Inoue's influence, I also played over a number of Shuwa's games. I like him the most of the historical Meijins. Most people prefer Shusaku, but I felt closer to Shuwa. Our go seemed to have a lot in common.

Any game by Shuwa would do, but how about the game below, chosen from his Complete Games at random? Shuwa is white and black is the 9th Yasui, Sanchi. White wins the game by five points. If you have some spare time, try playing the game through.


I think you'll find from this game that Shuwa's go is fast-moving and that he has a good perception of the overall position. He keeps moving ahead,



(1 - 62)

White: Honinbo Shuwa

Black: Yasui Sanchi (9th Yasui)



(Moves after 124 omitted)

beating the opponent to the large points. And his go is flexible. For example, if he makes a slight gain with a forcing move, he will stop worrying about that area. He will then play from the opposite direction. When he sacrifices, he does so smartly, without wasting time, then looks for somewhere else to start a fight. Above all, he does not fuss about, his go is 'flexible'. This aspect of his game really strikes a responsive chord in me.

Next, Go Seigen. I think that Go Seigen's go is in the same lineage of 'flexibility' as Shuwa's. If I might be permitted to tag on my own name: Shuwa — Go Seigen — Cho Chikun. The names lined up like this look impressive — remember, you read it here first.

Jokes aside, I studied Go Seigen as much as I did Shuwa. My study of Go Seigen's fuseki when I was a child has probably influenced me ever since.

Because I am always thinking about playing flexibly, I do not often play games in which I stake everything on attack or go all out to take profit. The picture is always changing rapidly. This is not a question of good or bad; it is the inescapable nature of my go. Not that my actual life is like that...

Consequently, although I suffer from some doubts now, I want to explore this theme of flexibility. This attitude is a part of me and there is no prospect of my making a hundred and eighty degree turn.

I would not be honest if I said that I had not been influenced by Kitani Minoru and Sakata Eio.

Kitani's go is the go of an idealist, of someone who stubbornly builds up his faith step by step. His go is slow-moving, but he fights with an irresistible power. When I was around 6-dan (1974), I experimented with his style, but carrying it through was beyond my strength.


Sakata clearly also plays flexible go, but it differs from the flexibility of Shuwa and Go Seigen. In contrast to the latter's 'intuitive flexibility', Sakata's flexibility is based on his analytical ability. He is perhaps the type who will try anything if he decides it can be read out. This is the difference between the analytical player and the intuitive player.

Broadly speaking, my go perhaps belongs to the profit-oriented school, but there are various elements in my game and it is somewhat chaotic.

I have no special preference in the fuseki and if possible I would like to master every style.

I do not know how good an account this is of my go. This essay seems to have ended up as chaotic as my game.

Cho also selected for 'Kido' a number of the most memorable games of his career. Two of these were given in GW22. Here is another one, against Cho's nemesis, Sakata Eio.



Game One, 22nd Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship (1974)
White: Sakata; Black : Cho. White resigns after 141 moves. (89, 92: ko)



Cho Chikun takes the Meijin title from Otake

Special Game Commentary

As a special game commentary, we are presenting a reader-participation project from *Gekkan Gogaku* in which Sekiyama Toshio 9-dan answers questions sent in from all over Japan about a game he played against Honda Kunihisa in the 6th Meijin preliminary rounds. Readers' questions and comments are printed in italics, Sekiyama's replies in ordinary type.

Black: Sekiyama 9-dan

White: Honda 9-dan

komi: 5½





Figure 1 (1 - 18)

Figure 1 (1 - 18)

What was the meaning of White 8?

It was a kind of ploy. When Black made the pincer at 7, he outnumbered White three to one on the right side, so he held the initiative there. For White 8 there are lots of joseki moves, such as 'a', but there may be truth to the idea that nothing good will come of engaging Black on Black's home ground. White therefore decided to abandon the lower right and try to use the positions of White 4 and Black 5 to take the initiative in the lower left. White 8 lets Black make good shape with 9, but it also gives White the upper hand when he plays 10. It's an example of the standard military strategy of choosing your battles on favourable ground. White was maneuvering for the initiative in the opening.

The two-space high pincer at 7 is considered the golden mean, but because of the relationship between White 4 and Black 5, a narrower pincer at 'b' might also have been good.




Dia. 1

Was Black 9 the 'only move'?

No. I chose it because I thought I remembered seeing the sequence from Black 1 to 7 in Dia. 1 in another of Honda's games, and I wanted to present him with something different this time. The diagonal move at 11 was chosen for the same reason.

Instead of Black 11, how about making a counter-pincer at 1 in Dia. 2?




Dia. 2

The purpose of Black 1 in Dia. 2 is to develop to 3 when White replies at 2, but White gets good local shape with 4. If the white stone in the top left corner were on the star point, Black 3 would have some effect on it, but with the white stone on the three-three point, Black 3 doesn't do much. The left side is unattractive.

Instead of Black 11, what about the attachment at 1 in Dia. 3? I imagine the sequence from White 2 to Black 5.


If White answers at 2 and 4, Black gets the same shape as in Dia. 1. In Dia. 1, where White



Dia. 3

had a two-space extension on the lower side, this worked very well for Black. (He could also have played 3 at 7, then attached at 3 after White 'a'.) In Dia. 3, however, when Black plays 1, White may extend at 3 instead of answering at 2. I'm not sure Black can cope with that. The surrounding conditions are not the same; Dias. 1 and 3 are completely different.


For White 12, I think the knight's move at 1 in Dia. 4 is the usual move.



Dia. 4


Black plays 2, White plays 3 or 'a', and Black plays 4. These are also the usual moves, and Black is quite happy. Just as the left side was unattractive to Black, however, it is also unimportant to White. Perhaps for that reason Honda decided to hurry events along with White 12. As for Black 13—

Dia. 5 One's first inclination is to cut across at 1. After White 2 to 8 —



Dia. 5


Dia. 6 Black and White would give atari at 9 and 10 and Black would take the ko at 11. After White's wedge at 12 it becomes extremely complicated, and since the outcome of this variation was not clear, I gave up on it. The conclusion in



Dia. 6

the post-game analysis was that it was playable for Black. After White 12, apparently Black should connect above 11.

For White 14, what about White 1 in Dia. 7?




Dia. 7


Black strikes at the diagonal gap with 2. Given the result through Black 6, this appears to be an overplay by White.

Instead of 15, can't Black play 1 and 3 in Dia. 8?

And have White play 4? Black 1 and 3 seem a bit soggy. White also has 'a' left.




Dia. 8



Dia. 9

At 18, what if White captures a stone with 1 and 3 in Dia. 9?

That is exactly what Black wants. He continues with 4 through 8 in Dia. 10 and gets a truly ideal result.



Dia. 10






Figure 2 (19 – 60) 32: captures at 28; 33: recaptures; 34: below 33; 40: ko at 28;

I thought that with 19, Black should have played 1 in Dia. 11 and definitely captured the white stone.

That would be like quitting the field of battle. White can play 2 and Black is short of eye shape. There is also the danger of White 2 at 'a', followed by Black 'b' and a white cut at 'c'.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Instead of White 20, how about giving atari at 1 and cutting at 3 in Dia. 12?


Black plays 4. Capturing the $\triangle$ stone in this shape gives him a good result. Black $\blacktriangle$ is still active. White 20 in the figure was necessary, and momentum carried us on from there.

With 25, what if Black descends at 1 in Dia. 13?


That seems bad because of White 2. Next –

Dia. 14 Black will peep at 3 and extend to 5. After 6 and 7, White can play 'a', 'b', and 'c' in sente. I thought that was a bit unbearable.


Instead of 28, I think White does better to give atari at 1 in Dia. 15 and continue with 3 and 5. What do you think?




Dia. 13



Dia. 15




Dia. 14




Dia. 16

Your point is well taken. Dia. 15 is definitely good for White. Black, however, will not play 4 in that diagram. Instead, he will just calmly fill one of White's liberties with 1 in Dia. 16. White 2 is a reasonable reply. This time, after Black 3 and 5, White can play only one of the two points 'a' and 'b' in sente, and Black has one point more territory than in Dia. 14, so he is satisfied.


To digress slightly, if White had played 26 at 1 in Dia. 17, I would have extended at 2. When White gives atari at 3, if Black connects at 'a', White 'b' gives the same result as in Dia. 15, but Black does not connect at 'a'. He thrusts down at 4 in Dia. 18. If White captures at 5, Black cuts at




Dia. 17



Dia. 18



Dia. 19



Dia. 20


6 in Dia. 19, then makes a ko threat at 8. If White connects with 5 in Dia. 20, Black gives atari at 6 and 8, then makes the same ko threat at 10. Both of these kos are good for Black.

Is the sequence in the bottom left corner a joseki?

It's not a so-called joseki. It was a product of the particular circumstances and of both sides' trying to outmaneuver each other. If these moves turn out to have any logical necessity, conceivably people will call them a joseki, but if they don't, further study will be required. Anyway, it was a variation I had never seen before.

Why doesn't Black connect with 31 at 28? I think the ladder favors him.

Think again. If Black connects at 1 in Dia. 21, White gives atari from above with 2 and 4, then from below with 6. Check it out for yourself.




Dia. 21


Which side came out ahead in the lower left?

The sequence in the figure was part of my reading, and I thought the result favored Black. After the game, Honda agreed.

Instead of 28, White should probably have played 1, then 3 in Dia. 22 (the result through Black 8 is the same as Dia. 16) or just 1 in Dia. 23. After Black 6, he could shift to the bottom right corner with 48 in the figure.



Dia. 22



Dia. 23

Why does White play stones like 44 and 46 that he knows will end up being captured?


These were good forcing moves. They spoiled Black's shape. Even if they do get captured, White hasn't lost anything. They may become plus factors for White in the future and they cannot become minus factors. They don't cost White anything. They're just good stones to have on the board.

Since Black gets such bad shape by connecting at 47, why not ignore White 46 and block at 50?


White 47 would be too big to allow. Note that the two black stones in the bottom left corner still have potential. Black has to grin and bear the bad shape — he can't let White cut at 47.

What about using Black 51 to connect at 1 in Dia. 24?

That's naturally worth considering. In fact, if we imagine the continuation from White 2 to Black 5 (or Black 'a'), this way looks better for Black. White probably can't cut with 2 at 'b', because of Black 2.



Dia. 24




Dia. 25

How about Black 53 at 1 in Dia. 25?

No go. White 4 leaves 5 and 6 as miai.

Instead of White 56, how about making the diagonal move at 1 in Dia. 26? If Black plays 2, White plays 3. I think this gives White better shape.

Black would answer White 1 at 'a'. Next if White plays 3, Black plays 'b'. I thought that would be good for Black. I even felt a certain admiration for White 56 and 58.



Dia. 26




Figure 3 (61 - 153)

85 at 75. 88 at 76. 90 at 75. 149 at 81


Figure 3 (61 - 153)

With Black 61, how about extending at 82?

Black 82, White 120 would lead to a different game, but since I was ahead, perhaps that is how I should have played. Black 61 was a rather stingy move.

White 62 is incomprehensible. Can't Black ignore it?

White 62 was a probe. If Black ignores it and extends at 1 in Dia. 27, he cannot answer White 2 by blocking at 3. If he blocks at 3, White 4 spells disaster. Black must therefore play 3 at 'a'.




Dia. 27

Despite this drawback, out of fighting spirit, perhaps I should have played Black 1. I played cautiously at 63 because I was ahead, but I may have been too conservative. White 64 was a good point. Further on, I should have played Black 69 a line to the left, at 'a'.

Before White invades at the three-three point with 70, why not cap at 1 in Dia. 28?


Black wouldn't mind answering at 2, since




Dia. 28

that would eliminate the invasion at 'a'. Or Black might defend the corner with 'b' or 'c'.

Instead of White 76, how about the sequence from 1 to 3 in Dia. 29?



Dia. 29



Dia. 30

That's worth considering, but if we take the standard continuation from Black 4 to 8 in Dia. 30, Black gets a large corner and the tri-angled stone ends up in a good position, so Black is quite happy.

To prevent the invasion at 92, why not play 91 at 'b'?

If Black plays 1 in Dia. 31, White will cut at 2. After Black 3 and White 4, it doesn't look so hot for Black.


With 91, could Black probe at 119?

You've come up with a very interesting idea. It's not clear whether the move is good or not — it's a difficult question — but the idea merits attention. During the game, the player inevitably tightens up and tends to choose safe moves like Black 91.


To go back to Black 69, I played that stone by feel without thinking very hard, but it made it easy for White to invade the upper right corner at the three-three point, then let White invade at 92. Again it's a difficult question, but this move was probably a mistake.

Can't White play 100 at 'c' or 'd'?

The moves from Black 93 to White 100 were correct. White 100 at 'c' would not be profitable because it would leave Black cutting potential at 100, and White 100 at 'd' would be needlessly



Dia. 31




Dia. 32

passive, because White 100 captures the black stone quite cleanly.


Instead of Black 111, why not live with 1 and 3 in Dia. 32?

Next White plays 4, Black attaches 5 to it, and there's a fight to the finish. I was a little afraid of this fight. I thought the squeeze I got from Black 111 was enough to win the game, but perhaps I was suffering from an attack of nerves. White probably has a hopeless battle in Dia. 32.

But rather than that, with Black 111 I had a good chance to probe at 1 in Dia. 33. I realized



Dia. 33



Dia. 34

this after the game. If White plays 2, Black plays 3 and executes the same squeeze as in the figure. Next he can go into action at 'a'. If White answers 1 with 2 through 8 in Dia. 34, as he did with 126–132 in the actual game, then Black can live with 9 to 11. Now if White 'a' and Black 'b', there's no doubt but that White's had it.

I can't understand why Black peeped at 119 and let White capture a stone with 120 and the rest.


Black 119 to 123 were related to the moves that followed in the top right corner. As you can see, the combination worked quite well.

What if White descends with 126 at 127?

He gets clobbered by Black 'e'. (Recall Dia. 33.)

What if White plays 126 at 1 in Dia. 35?


It's the same as the last question: Black plays 2. Next if White plays 'a', Black plays 'b'.



Dia. 35

With 153, why doesn't Black try to surround the top area?

You mean Black 1 in Dia. 36. That's a very attractive move, and during the game I had a hard time choosing between it and Black 153. If Black plays 1 in Dia. 36, he has to answer White 2 at 3 (if he connects at 'a', White plays 'b'), and White can attach at 4 and draw back at 6, looking toward the clamp at 'c' and the shoulder reduction at 'd'. It's not clear which is better: the figure or Dia. 36. I was puzzled.



Dia. 36





Figure 4 (154 - 214)
110 at 106. 113 at 107.

Figure 4 (154 - 214)

With 68, why doesn't White make a diagonal connection at 'a', threatening ko at 'b'?

When White plays 1 in Dia. 37, Black forces at 2, then defends at 4. If White takes the ko with 5, Black connects at 6 in sente, then lives with 8. (His second eye is at 'a'.) White is the one who gets into danger.




What happens if White cuts with 78 at 93?

If White cuts at 1 in Dia. 38, Black plays 2. If White plays 3, Black 4 nets him.

What happened in the endgame? White seems to have caught up considerably.

He did. My worst mistake was Black 95. I should have connected at 1 in Dia. 39, which is quite large. White 2 would be the probable reply. Next, if Black proceeds to the top edge with 3 and 5, he has the game won by a comfortable margin. Later, Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 40 give him 'a' and 'b' in sente.

When I missed this move and White captured



Dia. 39

Dia. 40

at 96, I lost my margin of safety and had to trust to luck. The rest of the endgame was like skating on thin ice.




Figure 5 (215 - 290)

89 connects at 28. 90 connects right of 34.

White wins the ko at 'a'.

Figure 5 (215 - 290)

To summarize this article, let me say that I was struck by the freedom of thought in the questions that were sent in. Since go is a serious game, I tend to play carefully and tighten up. Answering these questions made me painfully aware of being bound by the limits of my own puny powers — of being unable to play moves when I cannot see clearly what they will lead to. I think a professional must always show freedom and boldness, but he must also accept responsibility for his moves, and work out their consequences in advance. There is a difficult conflict here. To play well, a professional must play boldly, but he must also pay attention to details.

Black wins by ½ point.

(Translated by James Davies)

28th Oza Title

The 28th Oza title match was an important one for both the defender, Kato Masao, and the challenger, Ishida Yoshio. Both players were in a slump, so winning this match would be an important first step on the path to recovery. Kato was having his worst year since he first started winning titles in 1976 and had already lost the Judan and Honinbo titles, though of course, being Kato, that still left him with two. Ishida needed a win much more badly. He had already won the Oza title twice, but when he first won it, in 1974, he also held the Meijin and Honinbo titles and thus had a strong claim to be considered the top player of the day. Now, in contrast, he is not only without a title but has even lost his place in the Honinbo and Meijin leagues. For a player of his ability, this is a truly horrendous slump. His only title in the last five years (apart from TV haya-go) has been his second Oza title, in 1978. Since he lost this to Kato in 1979, he must have been all the more determined to take his revenge.

Game One

White: Kato Masao, Tengen & Oza

Black: Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

date: 5th November, 1980

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

White 14. The exchange for 15 is a bit of a loss for White, but if he hanes at 15 with 14, the large-







Figure 1 (1 – 50)




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 4



Dia. 3

scale joseki in Dia. 1 will follow. The fight after 34 would be favourable for Black because his ▲ stones would work effectively.

White 16. Kato: 'I felt very tempted to attack at 20, but Black would then take the upper left corner and my game would be too biased to the bottom. With 18 and 20, I adopted a leisurely policy.'

Black 23. Not Black 1 in Dia. 2, as that would give White good moves at 2 and 4. By playing 24 at 25 and cutting, White could capture three stones, but it would not be worth it.

White 24. Not a good peep; simply jumping to 'a' would be better.

Black 35 is an unusual move. The usual joseki is shown in Dia. 3. After the sequence to 7, White would have a nice move at 8. Black wants to prevent White from getting such nice shape at the top.

White 40. White 'b' would let Black make superb shape with 40.

White 44. A standard move, but not the best answer here. White 1 and 3 in Dia. 4 would have

been better. The continuation to 13 is probable and would have given White the initiative. When White lives in the corner, the black groups on both sides are threatened.





Figure 2 (51 - 100)




Dia. 5

Figure 2 (51 - 100)


The sequence to 53 seems forced. The result is good for Black, since he has lived in an area where White was stronger.

White 54. White plays all-out because he has not done well at the top, but White 60 is actually the honte. Black seizes the opportunity to make a severe invasion at 57. Since 57 makes miai of 61 and 'a', White is in trouble. He is forced to give way up to 64 and falls way behind. Instead of 58 -

Dia. 5. If White defends at 1, Black will play at 2. This move is a decoy, for Black is not necessarily trying to live here. To kill him, however, White must counter with 3 etc., so Black is able to play 12 and 14 in sente, thus setting up the capture at 16. If White completes the kill with 17, Black attacks the other white group with 18. If White 'a', Black 'b'; if then



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

White 'c', Black 'd' puts White on the spot.


White 62 is forced. If White cuts at 1 in Dia. 6, Black will first play Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e' in the figure to make the ladder favourable, then he will counter with 2 and 4 in the diagram. Since 'a' and 'b' are miai for Black, White collapses.

Black 63. Not 1 in Dia. 7 because of White 2 and 4.


Black 65 is too greedy. If Black had played more conservatively, on the fourth line at 75, he would have had a sure win. Black 65 gives White enough leeway on the side to make a strong invasion beginning with 70.

Black 71. If Black hanes above or below 70, White can settle himself by playing at 'f'.

Dia. 8. Since the ▲ stone is not at 'a', Black has no effective counter to White 1. If the hane at 2, White cuts at 3, making miai of 'b' and 'c'; if Black 2 at 'd', White secures a large life with White 3, Black 'c', White 'e' etc.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Black cannot kill the invaders, so he contents himself with minimising the damage with 81. White easily escapes with the tesuji of 86 and the result to 94 makes the game even again.

White 100. White 'g' is the honte, but White wants to stop Black from getting eye-shape.

Figure 2 (101 - 144)

Black 17. The timing of this ko was Ishida's





Figure 3 (101 - 144)

main mistake of the game. White would have been in trouble if Black had started the ko with 7, that is, 1 in Dia. 9.

Dia. 9. Black can use the cut at 3 as a ko threat. White has no choice but to end the ko with 4, so Black can capture a stone with 5. Black's thickness would give him an edge over White. The latter has to worry about the cut at 'a', whereas in the game his position is much thicker.

Black 13. Again Black should play at 17. In effect, Black started the ko at the worst time. When White captures at 20 and blocks at 22, he has staged an upset. Black 13 becomes almost useless after Black 19 and 21.

Black 37 is the final losing move. Until now the game has been close, although Black is a little behind, but this peep makes the game close on the board. Black is hoping for White 2 in Dia. 10, after which he would be able to invade at 3. White could not cut at 4, as Black 1 gives



Dia. 10

Black a ladder. However, White just ignores 37 to defend at 38. Cutting at 41 is almost worthless – it's just a dame point. Instead of 37, Black should have played at 38 himself; White 40, Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' White 'd' would follow and Black would still have a chance, as he would just be a fraction behind.

Figure 4 (145 - 190)

Black resigns after White 190.




Figure 4 (145 - 190)

Game Two

White: Ishida Yoshio

Black: Kato Masao

date: 19th November, 1980





Figure 1 (1 - 16)


Figure 1 (1 - 16)

Black 13, 15, Black plays aggressively, leading to a new pattern. Instead of 13, Black could also play at 1 in Dia. 1 (next page). The sequence to 6 would follow, then Black would make a pincer at 7.


White 16 is the only move. If White played at 1 in Dia. 2 (next page), Black 2 etc. would be a severe cut. Black could sacrifice the corner, as



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

he would get ample outside thickness. Instead of 17 —

Dia. 3. If White plays 17 here, Black plays 18 to 22, aiming at the ko at 'a' (or Black could play the ko immediately with 22 at 'a'). White collapses.






Figure 2 (17 – 50)

Figure 2 (17 – 50)

Black 17. Dia. 4 shows that Black cannot cut. The sequence to 11 is similar to Dia. 2, but White then cuts at 12 and Black collapses. Even if Black plays 11 at 12, White can play 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', which is bad for Black. However, it becomes apparent that if Black had a stone at 'd', he could make an effective sacrifice with 'e' in answer to White 'c'. That is why Black plays 17 in the figure.



Dia. 4




White is compelled to change course with 30, but when Black attacks at 33, then defends at 37, he takes a definite lead.

The exchange from 38 to 43 is natural. Black seems to be giving up the corner, but there is a lot of aji there, while he gets nice thickness with 43.

White 48 is a bad move which loses the threat of cutting at 49. White should omit 48 and just live with 50, as in Dia. 8.

Dia. 8. If White 1, then Black 2; White must live with 3 to 7, but now Black has to defend against the cut with 8, so White can jump out to 9. White thus gains a move.



Dia. 8





Figure 3 (51 - 100)

Figure 3 (51 - 100)


Black 51. Black 'a' (as in Dia. 8) is correct: it strengthens Black's moyo more.

White 54. White has to live in gote, a sad contrast to Dia. 8. Incidentally, note that playing first at 1 in Dia. 9 would not be profitable.

Dia. 9. When Black hanes at 2, White still has to play 3 to live, but Black can now use the throw-



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

in at 4 to get a ko to the left.


Black 55. Black 'b' would be better, as White 56 is a good forcing move which spoils Black's thickness. Even better, this would be a good chance to play in the corner with 1 in Dia. 10. The profit Black takes to 11 would decide the game.

Black 71. Inconsistent with Black's attacking moves at 67 and 69. Black should of course cap at 72. Kato: 'I'll have to turn in my title of "the killer".' Ishida of course expected the cap, in which case he intended to play 2 to 6 in Dia. 11.


Black 73. Conventional but slack. This was Black's last chance to live in the bottom left corner. This time the sequence to 11 in Dia. 12 would be good for Black, and he would get an endgame follow-up at 'a'. Black's slack play in this figure has let White get back into the game.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

Black 91 is careless, as Black has the tesuji of 1 in Dia. 13. White cannot play at 'a', as Black 'b' would threaten the ko in Dia. 9. White must play 2, so Black could give atari at 3. Black would now have an eye in reserve here, so he would be able to fight more strongly in the centre later on.






Figure 4 (101 - 150)



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Figure 4 (101 - 150)

White 2 is a very patient move, as permitting Black 3 seems to give Black too much territory. Instead of invading at the top right, however, White is more concerned with causing trouble on the left. He launches a severe attack with 4 to 8, but Black just barely survives the onslaught with the tesuji of 15.

Black 9. Black cannot attach immediately at 1 in Dia. 14. White counters with 2 to 12, capturing two key stones.


White 16. If at 2 in Dia. 15, White can capture some stones up to 10, but Black also gets territory on the side. Apparently, this would not be good enough.

Black 21. Black has to give up his two stones.

Dia. 16. If Black tries to escape with 1, White will kill the whole group.

Black 23. Note that White cannot cut at 41, as Black has the warikomi of 'a'.

White 24. Forestalling the Black 'b'-'c' com-




Dia. 16

ination.


Black 25. Black 'd' would be more solid, but the game is so close that that might not be enough.

White 26 is the main reason why White lost, according to Kato. Black is grateful for the chance to block at 27, as that secures a large territory at the top. Kato was afraid that White would attack at 1 in Dia. 17.

Dia. 17. If Black 2, White will play 2 to 9 and Black would have no chance of killing him, so the territorial balance would be upset. Instead of 2 -



Dia. 17




Dia. 18

Dia. 18. Black 2 and 4 would be safer, but that would make White 1 a superb forcing move, while White would also have 5 and 7 for later.

Black 47. If omitted, White can attack with 1 to 5 in Dia. 19.

White 48. If White 26 is the main cause of White's loss, the actual losing move is White 48. Letting Black play 49 in sente is terrible, so White must play at 'e' with 48, forcing Black 'f'. Kato was convinced that he had a win after 49. It seems that Ishida underrated the importance of Black's top area throughout the game.



Dia. 19





Figure 5 (151 - 200)



Dia. 20

Figure 5 (151 - 200)


White 58. White cannot block at 1 in Dia. 20,

because if Black can play 2 in sente, he can kill the group to the right with 4 to 8.

Black 63. Kato's heart stopped for a moment. If he carelessly answers at 1 in Dia. 21, White kills the group with 2 to 6. White gets 'flowery six' (hana-roku), reducing Black to one large eye.

Black 75 is the last large point. The subsequent moves do not affect the outcome.

Black wins by 2½ points.



Dia. 21





Figure 6 (201 - 262)


56: ko (right of 13); 57: connects (left of 15);
60: connects (at 13); 61: connects (at 44);
62: connects (right of 2)

Basic Fighting Techniques


Miyazawa Goro



Problem One. White to play
White has to defend against two peeps. (6-kyu)



Problem Two. Black to play
Black can take advantage of a defect in White's shape. (5-kyu)



Problem Three. White to play
White can seal Black in the corner. (5-kyu)



Pattern Nine: The Tsukekoshi

The tsukekoshi is a tesuji which takes advantage of the weakness of the keima or knight's move. The positions discussed in this issue are all illustrations of a popular proverb, 'keima ni tsuke-

Miyazawa 6-dan koshi' or 'attach across the knight's move' (also translated, more picturesquely but less accurately, as 'strike at the waist of the knight's move — 'koshi' here does not mean 'waist' but is from the verb 'kosu', to cross). Fortunately, this is a proverb with a high degree of reliability. Its main virtue is that it often gives one sente where one might not expect it or enables one to defend against a double threat.






Illustration One: Black to play

Black has to defend against White's peep at 'a'. Can he do so in sente?

Dia. 1. Black 1 follows the proverb.




Dia. 1: the proverb




Dia. 2: success

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black cuts at 3. This enables him to repair the defect in his shape, in sente



Dia. 3: large yose




Dia. 4: inadequate

moreover.

Dia. 3. If White omits 4 and 6 in Dia. 2, capturing with 1 and 3 is quite large.


Dia. 4. Black 1 is too slow. White may just switch elsewhere and the continuation Black 'a' — White 'b' is not as good for Black as Dia. 3. Needless to say, however, it is not as bad as Black 'c'—White 1—Black 'd'.




Problem One: White to play

Here White's survival depends upon coping with two peeps.

Dia. 1. If White docilely connects at 1, Black leads him to the slaughter. White does not have eyes in the corner.




Dia. 1: dead



Dia. 2: the tesuji

Dia. 2. White 1 is the answer. This tesuji comes up all the time in actual play.

Dia. 3. Sacrificing a stone enables White to



Dia. 3: escape

escape to the outside. This solidifies Black at the top, but that's a small price to pay for living. If Black 6 at 7, White is content to live at the top.






Illustration Two: Black to play

This is another pattern that comes up constantly in actual play. The problem is dealing with the double threat of White $\triangle$.


Dia. 1. This result needs no comment.



Dia. 1: useless




Dia. 2: worse




Dia. 3: counterattack

Dia. 2. Connecting at 1 is also useless.

Dia. 3. Since Black has two cutting points to



Dia. 4: connection




Dia. 5: unavailing

defend, he must take sente. Countering with 1 is the first step.

Dia. 4. If White 2, Black sacrifices his stone in order to prevent White from cutting.


Dia. 5. If White answers more aggressively, with 1 here, Black 2 is good enough. If White 'a' next, Black squeezes with 'b'.




Problem Two: Black to play

This time it is not a question of life and death but of exploiting a defect in White's shape to block his group off from the centre.

Dia. 1. Bluntly attacking with 1 is not satisfactory. White 2 is sente, and after Black 3 White can aim at cutting on the side after White 'a'—Black 'b' and he could also aim at White 'c'.



Dia. 1: failure




Dia. 2: the tesuji


Dia. 2. Sacrificing a stone with 1 is necessary.

Cutting at 3 gives Black an excellent atari at 5, sealing White in the corner in sente. Instead of 4 —

Dia. 3. Giving atari at 1 helps Black to build additional thickness with a ponnuki. White does gain sente, but Black is still satisfied. Black 'a' is a good point for later.



Dia. 3: satisfactory




Problem Three: White to play


White can use the tsukekoshi tesuji to seal Black into the corner.

Dia. 1. When White plays 1, Black must answer with 2 and 4 to save his corner stones, so White can seal him in with 5 and 7. Black has to play 8 to prevent White from making a placement there. Instead of 4 —


Dia. 2. If Black counters with 1 and 3, White




Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2: success



Dia. 3: success



Dia. 4: thickness

can gouge out his corner with the tesuji of 4. If Black 'a', then White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black connects, White 'e'. Black would then have to seek life on the side, but he would not be able to get a strong shape.

Dia. 3. If Black parries feebly with 2, White is quite happy to pick up two stones with 3 to 7. Since this is not satisfactory for Black either, the conclusion is that he must reinforce his corner position with 'a' before White gets a chance to attack. Instead of 6 —

Dia. 4. If Black tries to save the corner stones with 1, White plays 2 and 4, setting up the atari at 6. White captures a stone in a ladder with 8, thus getting outside thickness, while Black still has to get his second eye with 9. White can also cut at 6 instead of 4; if Black 'a', White captures the corner by playing down at 4.


(*'Gekkan Go'*, September 1978)

Page from Go History (continued)

Figure 4 (161 — 228)

Black 105 is the losing move. The game would be quite close if Black just linked up with Black 119, White 'a', Black 123. Since Black does not have enough ko threats to win the ko, Black 105 becomes an outright loss.


White 128 secures life for the group. If Black keeps on trying to kill White with 1 etc. in Dia. 6, White captures his stones on the side with the standard tesuji to 10.



Dia. 6


6: connects below 2; 7: left of 2

Black resigns after 228.




Good and Bad Style


Black to play




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
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


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


90


Vulgar Style




Black 1, 3 and 5 are as crude as you can get; moreover, these moves accomplish very little.




Connecting at 1 is insipid; White captures the corner stones with 2 (if Black 'a', White 'b').



Since White's shape is so solid here, the ▲ stone is light. Consequently, one hardly feels inclined to connect at 1.




Black 1 is a model vulgar move. Black 'a' or 'b' instead would also not be forceful enough.




Black 1 is stolid and conventional. Black actually has a much more interesting move here.


Correct Style




Black 1 is the tesuji; if White 2, Black captures the corner $\triangle$ stones with 3.




White is thus forced to answer at 2, but Black 3 is sente, so Black gets nice shape with 5.




Black should block at 1, then give atari at 3.




White cannot connect at 'a', so he must play 4 to capture the corner stones. However, Black can now capture two stones in sente with 'a'.




The knight's move of 1 is correct shape. This is a light move which develops rapidly towards the centre.




If White had no stone at 'a', it would of course be worthwhile to connect at 1, as Black could then aim at cutting.




Attaching at 1 is good style. If White 2, Black makes good shape with 3.



If White counters with 2, Black is happy to play 3 and 5, as the $\triangle$ stones become even weaker.



Black 1 is a severe hane. White cannot answer at 'a' because of Black 'b'.



6: connects

White must answer at 2, so Black gets a very satisfying squeeze with 3 and 5. The result to 7 is quite a contrast to the 'vulgar' move.

The Great Joseki Debate


Honda Kunihisa 9-dan

How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. Three proposals are being made for Black's next move: which one fits this opening best?


A: It's obvious that Black has to connect at 1. White has a lot of good moves in the upper right corner, so he's strong at the top. That being the case, Black should play solidly.

B: It's certainly true that the top is important, but it's the hane that does something about it. Also, it treats the right side lightly so it's the only move.


C: B's move settles the position too soon, so it isn't very satisfactory. The position calls for large scale fighting and the nobi at 1 accomplishes just that.




Dia. A



Dia. B



Dia. C



Fuseki Diagram

Fuseki Analysis


The direction in which the joseki acts is a major factor in choosing a joseki. Consequently, the adjacent sides and corners determine the choice except in the case of a ladder when one must also check the position in the opposite corner. In this issue's fuseki the positions in the upper right and lower left will influence the choice.

In the upper right corner a white stone on the five-three point is facing a black stone on the three-four point. White has the superior position as he can press Black down at any time with such moves as 'a' or 'b'. It is this assumption that has led him to start the avalanche pattern with the marked stone in the upper left corner.

A consequence of the joseki in the lower left corner is that this area has been played out since the marked black stone is on the third line. Had Black played a knight's move at 'c' instead, then the value of the left side would double. This is in accordance with the general principle that the third line forsakes future development for immediate gains whereas the fourth line exerts power and is rich in future possibilities.

The choice of joseki in the upper left corner must fulfill two conditions then: first, it must attach importance to the top; and second, it must not face the left side.

It should also be noted that in this fuseki the bottom is a less important area than the top.




Dia. 1


Good points here are 'd' for Black and 'e' or 'f' for White.

B Wins the Debate

The hane at 1 in Dia. 1, that is, the small avalanche joseki, is correct and will form the basis of this issue's study.




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

What is called the avalanche (nadare) pattern is given in Dia. 2 and comes about from White's pushing in at 3 and then blocking at 5. After White 5 Black answers at one of the points marked 'a' to 'd' in Dia. 3. The variation at 'a' is known as the small avalanche (konadare) joseki and the variation at 'b', followed by White 'a', as the large avalanche (onadare) joseki. Both the connection at 'c', which is solid, and the hane at 'd', which is peaceful, can be used to avoid difficult variations that are a feature of the small and large avalanche patterns.




Dia. 4

Playing the hane at 1 in Dia. 4 assumes a ladder favorable to Black. The moves through White 4 are all absolutely necessary, as is Black 5 in Dia. 5. Because this move




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

threatens to capture the white stones with 'a', Black must defend with the logical connection at 6, although if the ladder (to be discussed later) were favorable for him, he could extend at 7. Black now gives atari at 7. After the exchange of White 6 for Black 7, Black has no way to capture the white stones. After White cuts at 8, he captures a stone with 9 in Dia. 6 and then plays the tesuji of 11 in Dia. 7. White cannot capture at 'a', as Black simply plays 'b'; consequently, he comes out at 12 in Dia. 8. Each side then captures a stone and the joseki comes to an end.




Dia. 7




Dia. 8


The final result is given in in Dia. 9. Although White's thickness is considerable, Black's is enormous because of the capture of two stones. It is also important to note that Black's power dominates the upper side, whereas White's is active along the left side.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10




Dia. 11

Although the capture at 14 in Dia. 8 is certainly worth a move, it is possible that White will play elsewhere. If he does so, however, he must be prepared for Black 1 in Dia. 10. One possible continuation is given in Dia. 11, where White pushes

at 2 and Black ataris at 3. There can be no question that the difference between this diagram and Dia. 9 is large.



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

6 connects (above 4)


If Black is afraid of the possibility of a white tenuki and wants to have sente at all costs in order to take some unusually valuable point, he does have a way. After White cuts at 8 in Dia. 5, Black can attach at 1 in Dia. 12 instead of capturing the black stone. Since White is unable to connect at 'a' because of Black 'b', he plays atari at 2 in Dia. 13. Black now cuts at 3 and the sequence to the connection at 6 follows. (In place of 2 White can also play at 'a', after which Black 5 and White 'b' would follow.) Although Black is guaranteed sente, the difference between this diagram and Dia. 9 is also huge, so Black should not play it thoughtlessly.

The ladder mentioned earlier comes up after Black turns at 5 in Dia. 14. If White extends at 6 in Dia. 15 instead of playing at 'a',




Dia. 14


Black must crawl out at 7 since a white block there would be intolerable. After White cuts at 8 Black is able to establish a ladder through the series of ataris to 13 in diagram 16. In the case that the ladder does not favor him, Black has no choice but to force at 2 and then block at 4 after White has nobied in diagram 17. Black captures two stones in the sequence to 8, but since the block at 9 in diagram 18 is sente, he must add another move at 10 or 'a'. White now has the choice of pushing at 'b' or extending to 'c'. For Black this is not a very welcome result.




Dia. 15




Dia. 16



Dia. 17




Dia. 18



Dia. 19


If the ladder does favor Black after the 1–2 exchange in Dia. 19 (White 6–Black 7 in Dia. 15), White has to extend again at 3 to avoid capture. Black can now connect at 4 and capture the corner. If White continues at ‘a’, Black attaches at ‘b’; if White tries ‘c’, Black crawls at ‘a’. This result is unacceptable for White.



Dia. 20

Dia. 20 shows the small avalanche joseki – the marked white stone is White 14 in Dia. 8 – played out against the fuseki diagram. Black’s thickness exerts power across the upper side, whereas White’s aims down the left side. This result follows B’s expectations and, backed up by the thickness in the upper left, the pincer at 1 should give Black an easy game. One can suppose White answering at ‘a’ and the sequence through ‘f’ following, although ‘f’ could be switched to ‘g’.


If White extends to 1 in Dia. 21 instead of capturing with the marked stone in Dia. 20, Black can come out immediately at 2. If one assumes the continuation to 12, Black can have no reason to be dissatisfied. It is no good insisting that the



Dia. 21

left side was an unimportant area – if it swells out to these proportions, it obviously assumes considerable value. As an alternative, Black could also play at ‘a’, with an eye to coming out at 2 later. This is also a strong way to play.

Finally, it is necessary to look at the ladder that develops after the sequence to 8 in Dia. 22. Black sets up the ladder with 9 in Dia. 23 and, because the white stone is on the three-three point, is just able to guide it successfully down to the edge.




Dia. 22


A’s Proposal

A has recommended the tight connection at 1 in Dia. 24. It is solid and the essence of simplicity. White must nobi at 2 and if Black plays the usual move at 3, White can press down at 4, all his stones suddenly coming to life. (In the local context only, White 4 should be at ‘a’.) Black, by contrast, has little to be pleased about as his jump out to 3 is pointing in a valueless direction.


By switching 3 to the hane at 1 in Dia. 25 and then crawling at 3, Black could at least take sente so as to be able to take the desirable point at 5 in the upper right. However, when White



Dia. 23



Dia. 25




Dia. 24

answers at 6, it is clear that he is still building on a very large scale. Moreover, because Black's position is so low everywhere, there is a feeling that the board has started to become a white sea. This method cannot be called good, either.


C's Proposal

C was in favor of extending out at 1 in Dia. 26 and was no doubt anticipating the large avalanche joseki initiated by White 'a' and Black 'b'. If that joseki were played, the outlook for White would not be very good. However, it is more likely that White would leave the upper left corner as it is and press down at 2. This move, which also occurred at White 4 in Dia. 24, initiates the taisha




Dia. 26

joseki, a pattern which shares with the avalanche joseki a reputation for complexity.



Dia. 27

The basic variation has Black attaching at 3 in Dia. 27 and White playing in at 4. The moves to black 11 follow and, after White connects




Dia. 28


at 12 in Dia. 28, the moves to White 20 flow naturally. White's three marked stones have now come to be nicely positioned and complete the encirclement of the four black stones. Furthermore, a white move at either 'a', or thereabouts, would make possible the white cut at 'b'. It should be apparent that Black's group has become somewhat sickly.

If Black tries the simpler approach of attaching at 3 in Dia. 29, White builds on a fine scale with the sequence through 10. White can even draw added satisfaction from the fact that, when the sequence in the upper right is compared with the joseki White 4—Black 5—White 2—Black 'a', he has forced Black to crawl an extra line. White may also omit the White 8—Black 9 exchange, if he wishes.

Black could also try not answering White 2 and drop down at 3 in the upper left in Dia. 30.




Dia. 29




Dia. 30

Locally this is an excellent move, nevertheless White will be more than happy to attach at 4 and block at 6 on the right. While Black is making life up to 15, White becomes powerful on the outside. Having sente, he can then take a point such as 16 and have a very promising game. Black, meanwhile, has been confined to three corners.



Dia. 31



Dia. 32

The position in the upper left corner is the same as if White had played three forcing moves against a large knight's enclosure, as in Dia. 31. Because the corner has been strengthened, it cannot necessarily be said that the white moves are good forcing moves; however, since they are facing the outside, the fault is not serious.

The moves up to 3 in Dia. 32 give the large avalanche joseki. After the necessary moves to 6 Black can attach at 'a', turn out at 'b', or turn in at 'c'. This order also represents the historical development of the joseki, but since it will not be examined in this article, the reader may wish to consult Volume 2 of the Dictionary of Basic Joseki for a detailed discussion.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'*, Dec. 1980. Translated by D. Thayer.)

2nd Polish Championship

The 1980 Polish Championship was a double-elimination event, in the course of which the eventual winner met the runner-up three times. The third of their encounters is given below, with a commentary by Sakai Masanori 4-dan.

White: Janusz Kraszek

Black: Krzysztof Moczyński

komi: 5½; Warsaw. November 2, 1980





Figure 1 (1 - 37)

Figure 1 (1 - 37)

Black 9. Black 'a', from the broad side of the 1-5 enclosure, is probably the correct extension.

Black 13. Instead of this, Black should make a pincer attack at 'b'.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. White can live with 2 through 8, but then Black gets sente.

Black 15 is an overextension. Black 'b' is again correct.

White 16. White should invade at 'b'.


Dia. 2. If Black extends to 2, White 3 makes good shape. If Black plays 2 in the upper right to stop 3, White extends to 'a', catching the triangled stone in a pincer.



Dia. 2

Black 17 tries to surround too much territory, and poses little threat to the relatively strong white position to the left. Black should back-pedal to 'c', killing off White 6.

White 18 is needlessly defensive. Once again, White should invade.



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. White 1 is one possible invasion. If Black replies at 2, White 3 works well. If Black does not play 2, then 2 becomes a good point for White.


Black 19. Black should just play 21.

White 20 is overly defensive again. White should extend to 'd'.

Black 27 is a shape mistake. Jumping straight out to 'e' is correct.

White 28. White should keep on jumping into the center, at 1 in Dia. 4.

Dia. 4. If Black replies at 2, that becomes White's cue to invade at 3.



Dia. 4





Figure 2 (38 - 100)

Figure 2 (38 - 100)

Black 39 leaves bad *aji*. Black should connect at 'a'.

White 48. Since White has a possible connection up the left side (White 'b', threatening 67), he can afford to invade more deeply. White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e' would be good.

White 52. Black welcomes this move, because it gives him a good chance to convert his framework into territory. Instead —



Dia. 5

Dia. 5. White might try the attachment at 1. If Black hanes at 2, White counters at 3, aiming to cut at 5. Depending on the continuation, White 'a' may also materialize.

Black 57 is an overplay, as White 58 and 60 promptly demonstrate. Black should complete the defense of the top right with 'f', then invade the bottom right corner at 'g' or, if White closes the corner, strike at 'h'.

White 62 is again overly defensive. Even if Black 57 gets away, that does not hurt White so much. White should skip down to 'i', which would be large territorially and would help defend the group attacked by Black 61.

Black 67. Instead of answering White 66,

Black should capture White 64 with 89. White could not break through.

However, the exchange through 87 gives Black a fifty-point territory and puts him into the lead.

Black 97 gives White an easy life with 98 and 100. Black should block from the corner at 'j'; then life would not be so easy. The outcome could well be a *ko*, and even to get a *ko*, White might have to resort to the 'k-l' exchange, giving Black a monkey jump to 'm'.





Figure 3 (101 - 161)

Figure 3 (101 - 161)

Black 3. There is a more effective way to play this move.

Dia. 6. Black 1 also threatens to kill the corner (with 2). After White defends, Black can play 3. If White connects at 4, Black plays 5 through 9 in sente, then puts the game away with the tesuji combination of 11 and 13 in the bottom right.






Dia. 6

Black 7. Black should hane at 'a'.

Dia. 7. Black 1 and 3 remove the potential of White 'a'. Next Black plays 5. If White blocks at 6, Black 7 links up safely.

White 12 is the wrong answer to the monkey jump in this position.


Dia. 8. If Black extends to 1, White has



no good way to stop him.


Dia. 9. White should therefore play 1 and 3. This combination is one of the standard answers to the monkey jump.

White 22 is a good point, but White 20 and 22 are played in the wrong order. Since 22 is the probe and 20 is the action move, White should play 22 first.




Dia. 10. White probes at 1. If Black answers at 2, as he did in the actual game, White plays 3, threatening 4, then links up at 5 for an excellent result.

Dia. 11. If Black blocks at 2, then instead of



playing 'a', which does not work. White feints toward the center with 3 perhaps, threatening both 'a' and 'b'.


Black 23 could and should have been at 26.



Dia. 12. White 2 fails, as White ends a move behind in the capturing race. If White plays 2 at 6, Black answers at 4.

White 24 should be 26.

Black 25 should also be at 26.



Dia. 13. With 'a' and 'b' as miai, Black is in no danger.

After escaping with 26 and 28 and skilfully squeezing with 40 to 48, White obtains almost as much territory inside Black's former framework as Black gets himself.

White 54 is a careless mistake, but White has the game won despite it.




Figure 4 (162 - 222)
Figure 4 (162 - 222)
White wins by 10½ points.

1980 French Championship

The French Championship is decided by a best-of-three match. The 1980 winner was Andre Moussa, who beat 1979 champion Jean Michel in two games straight. The second game follows. Commentary by Sakai Masanori.

White: Andre Moussa

Black: Jean Michel

Grenoble, November 16, 1980




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 5. Conventional opening theory (corners, then sides, then center) suggests that a move at 'a' would be more valuable.

White 8, although joseki, is thin. There is no need for White to choose a thin joseki in this opening.

White 10 is correct. White has either remarkable intuition or a remarkable knowledge of Ishida's *Dictionary of Basic Joseki*.


Black 11 through 15 are not bad, particularly in this situation, but just for reference, the usual joseki has Black 11 at 34.

Dia. 1. Black pushes at 1 and White replies at 2. After another optional push at 3, Black takes the corner with 5.


White 20 forces Black into an empty triangle, but contradicts White 22.

Dia. 2. White should simply play 1. Black will reply with 2 and 4, and now White has a potential atari at 'a' instead of 'b'.

White 28. There is little point in White's playing here. White 28 is thin and the black group below it is strong. The proper way for



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

White to approach this corner is from the other side, at 47, or by invading it at the three-three point.

Black 29 makes White 28 a better move. Black should jump to 'b' instead of 29.

Black 41 allows White to squeeze with 42 and 44 in sente, and is therefore wrong. Black should play 41 at 45.

White 46 leaves the dangerous potential of Black 'c'. White should net Black 33 with 'd'. White 46 may look thick and White 'd' thin, but the truth is the opposite.

Black 49 leaves the possibility of White 'e', Black 'f', White 'g', which could become annoying if White got a stone at 'h'. Black should play 49 at 'e'.





Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

White 62 extends too far, leaving an invasion point at 63. White 88, Black 89, White 'a' is the proper sequence here.

Black 63, however, is premature. First Black should defend by extending to 89. Next he would have an excellent invasion at 'b'.

White 64. The ordinary attachment at 1 in Dia. 3 is preferable.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Assume the standard sequence from 1 through 7. Black links himself together, but White forms a huge valley of potential territory.

White 68. White should just defend at 90. He need not worry about Black 84, because he can save 62 through an attachment at 'c'.

Black 71. Black had a grand opportunity here.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Black should block at 1. If White gives atari at 2, Black makes a counter-atari at 3, then settles himself in the middle of White's framework with 5. Next, if White pincers the triangled stone, Black enters the top left corner. White has scant territory, and his group to the right of 5 is weak.

Dia. 5. If White plays 1 (instead of 2 in Dia. 4), Black catches him in a ladder.

Black 85. Before defending the left side, Black should break up the lower side with 'd'. Black 'd' would be sente against the white group to the right, threatening 'e'.



Dia. 5





Figure 3 (101 – 176)


Figure 3 (101 – 176)

White 26. White could have ended the game by blocking at 1 in Dia. 6.

Dia. 6. Black hanes at 2 and White blocks at 3. If Black now plays 4, White connects at 5, threatening the outside cutting points. If Black connects at 6, White captures half a dozen stones with 7 ('a' and 'b' are miai).



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Dia. 7. If Black captures at 1 before cutting at 3, White responds with 2 and 4. Now 'a' and 'b' are miai.

Black 31 is the game-losing move.

Dia. 8. (next page) Black must reinforce himself by connecting at 1. After White lives by descending at 2 (he has an eye at 'a' no matter



Dia. 8

what Black does), Black extends to 3. That makes the game fairly even.

White's capturing four stones with 50, then getting sente to play 60, is decisive. Note that White can pick up two more stones in sente with the sequence White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. Black makes one last attempt to rescue the game, but only falls further behind.

Black resigns a few moves after White 176.

1980 British Championship

The 1980 British Championship was a repeat of the 1979 edition, with Matthew Macfadyen beating challenger Terry Stacey 3–1 to stay atop the heap. The hard-fought final game is shown below. Commentary by Sakai Masanori. Macfadyen is White.





Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

White 8. White should block at 11, after which there are a number of joseki variations. White 8 was tried once, in 1964 by Hashimoto Utao 9-dan, but it has rarely been seen since then (and in that game, Black did not have stones in both adjacent corners).


Black 11 is playable, but Black 1 in Dia. 1 may be stronger.

Dia. 1. If White attempts to contain Black with 2 and 4, Black hanes at 5. White's shape is beyond repair.



Dia. 1


White 16. With the backing of 6–14, White should make the more severe knight's approach.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If Black answers with 2, White develops with 3. This is better for White than the actual game because he has attacking moves like 'a' and 'b' for later.

White 22. White should build on a more modest scale with 'a'. One sees the aim of White 22 and 24, but –



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Assume this sequence. While White takes a large territory at the top, he builds up the right side for Black, making Black 8 an ideal

move. White's stones are overconcentrated; Black's are more efficient. Subtract from White's territory an amount equal to Black's top left corner and this becomes fairly clear.

White 26 avoids Dia. 3, but leaves a cutting point at 44.

White 28 is an overplay. White should defend at 39, as in Dia. 3. Black 29–35 make the cutting point at 44 a painful weakness.

White 40 is thin. White should defend at 49. Then his territory would be secure, and after Black 41 to 45, he could switch to the left side.

Black 49 is too direct. First Black should capture White 42 with 'b'. Then, instead of 49, he should probe at 'c'. If White answers 'c' at 'd', Black 49 works much better.





Figure 2 (51 – 100)
ko: 73, 79 (at 63), 80 (at 70);
84: connects at 71; 85: takes ko at 67.

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Black 75. Before fighting this ko. Black should finish the other one.

Dia. 4. Black captures at 1. If White does likewise at 2, Black cuts at 3, squeezes with 5 and 7, then extends to 9. White's stones are in very bad shape. If White plays 10, Black plays 11, threatening 'a' and a snapback.



Dia. 4
8 connects

White 86 captures four cutting stones, but the overall result is good for Black, because he lives inside White's territory and White has to accept gote at 90.

Black 91 is a good move. Black now has an easy game in front of him.

White 100 invites a counterattack. White should defend his group with 'a' before trying moves like 100.





Figure 3 (101 – 150)
ko: 34, 37, 42

Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Black 5 seems to have been misread.

Dia. 5. Black should give atari at 1, then connect at 3. White's group now faces a strong attack. The triangled stone is in just the right position to prevent White 'a'.



Dia. 5

White 16 captures five black stones unconditionally. (Considerable reading is needed to verify this. As a hint, if Black tries to escape with 40, White parries at 32.) This capture suddenly turns the game in White's favor, and the rest of Black's moves are tinged with desper-

ation.

Black 43. Containing White here does not make territory, and White can live. Black should just play 47, chasing White out at 43.





Figure 4 (151 - 216)

Figure 4 (151 - 216)

Black 53 is not the best invasion.



Dia. 6


Dia. 6. Black should invade at the three-three point. If White defends his territory with 2 through 8, Black connects at 9, which is sente against the bottom left corner, then jumps to 11. Black 'a' is his next aim. Black may have felt that this would not be enough to win, and he may have been right, but it was still the correct way to play.

White 58 leads to another fight. That seems to be White's style, but White 1 in Dia. 7 would have been safer.


Dia. 7. After Black gets out with 2, White 1 requires no further attention, so White can defend the bottom right with 3, 5, and 7.

Dia. 8. If Black gives atari at 1 (instead of 6 in Dia. 7), White makes good shape with 2 through 8.

Black 65 goes overboard on attack. Black 93 is the proper reply to White 64.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

5 connects


Black 79. Black takes the bottom right corner and gambles the game on being able to save his center group, but —

White 110 puts White one move ahead in the capturing race. The exchange of groups is vastly in White's favor.

Black 111. Black 1 in Dia. 9 would have made a ko, but with his center group gone and with White well supplied with ko threats on the upper and right sides, Black probably would have lost anyway.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Dia. 9. White 2 is the best response to Black 1, and Black 3 and 5 give a ko. The ko is direct. White cannot play 'a' in sente, since capturing the triangled stone would give him only a false eye.

Dia. 10. If White blocks at 1, he dies unconditionally.


Black 115. Due to the 111-112 exchange, Black 1 in Dia. 11 no longer works.

Dia. 11. White lives unconditionally by squashing Black with 4.

White 116. White is unconditionally alive and there is nothing more to fight over.

Black resigns at White 216.

(Translated by James Davies)



Dia. 11

Page from Go History

The Great Senchi – Forerunner of New Fuseki (ii)

The nineteenth century was the golden age of classical go in Japan. There were at least a dozen players worthy of being called geniuses and great advances were made in go theory. However, the century was opened by a player who was well in advance of his time. Yasui Senchi Senkaku (1764–1837, the 7th Yasui), who is usually known as the Great Senchi (O-Senchi), played a kind of go which had not been seen before. To describe its main characteristics:

- O-Senchi emphasised the 4th and 5th line. Consequently, his game was oriented towards the centre.
- He was fond of playing large moyos and was very skilful at fighting inside a moyo.
- He was also fond of takamoku (5–4) and mokuhazushi (5–3) fights

In contrast, in this period the third line was the normal line of play in the fuseki, while it was regarded as an absolute order of priority to play first in the corner, then on the side, then in the centre. It was not really until the New Fuseki period in the 1930's that O-Senchi's style of go was systematically developed and given firm theoretical underpinnings. Kitani Minoru, the co-founder of New Fuseki, was particularly fond of O-Senchi and acknowledged that he had been strongly influenced by him. In fact, Kitani often visited O-Senchi's grave at the Joshinji temple in Fukagawa in Tokyo to pay his respects to him.

O-Senchi was born in 1764, the son of Sakaguchi Sentoku (? – 1782), also a prominent go player. Sentoku had been a disciple of the 5th Yasui and he founded the Sakaguchi house as a branch family of the Yasui's. On Yasui's recommendation, he was permitted to play in the o-shiro-go, thus making him one of only ten players outside the four main go houses to do so during the Edo period.

O-Senchi was adopted as heir by the 6th Yasui and succeeded in 1780, when he was a 2-dan. In 1801 he was promoted to 8-dan and in 1814 he retired, handing over the reins of the Yasui house to Nakano Chitoku, the greatest Yasui player. He returned to his own Sakaguchi house and devoted himself to the instruction of his heir, Sakaguchi Sentoku (the same name as O-Senchi's father). This Sentoku became one of the top players of

the mid-19th century, being a member of the group known as the Tempo Best Four. There is a theory that he was actually the son of O-Senchi, in which case the Sakaguchi family produced great players for three successive generations, an unusual achievement.

O-Senchi v. Hayashi Monnyu

White: Hayashi Yugen Monnyu (? – 1798, 8th Hayashi)

2 stones: Yasui Senchi Senkaku

date: 17th November, 1780

This game is O-Senchi's first castle game. (His complete record was 18 wins, 9 losses, 2 jigo over 31 years.)




Figure 1 (1 – 53)

Figure 1 (1 – 53)

Black 12 is aji-keshi, since it loses the invasion at 27, but it is consistent with Black's next move.

White 17. If at 'a', Black will strike at 'b'; White 'c', Black 18, White 17, Black 20, White 'd', Black 23 would follow, but that would be terrible for White.

Black 26 is another aji-keshi move; its merit will be determined by Black's later play. Black's chance comes when White makes the low move at 29. He promptly plays the standard forcing sequence to 34, then stakes out his moyo with the magnificent move of 36. Black 'a' would make an even bigger moyo, but the cut by White at 'e' would be hard to deal with.




Figure 2 (54 - 100)

ko: 80, 83






Figure 3 (101 - 140)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

11: connects

Figure 2 (54 - 100)


Black 60. Better omitted, as it loses the aji of a contact play at 100.

Black 70. A powerful move, but one that has to be backed up by a lot of analysis. If Black plays the 'usual' move of 1 in Dia. 1, White 2 and 4 leave Black with no good continuation. If Black 'a', then White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'.


White 71 seems forced. If White connects at 1 in Dia. 2, he collapses after Black 2 to 12. If instead White 1 at 10, Black plays 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', connecting along the top, which would be uninteresting for White.

The large-scale exchange to 88 thus seems natural and the result is fifty-fifty.

Black 92 is well-timed. If White answers at 'a', Black will escape with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. That would be severe, since Black would also be threatening to cut with Black 93, White 'e', Black 'f'.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Figure 3 (101 - 140)

White 33 is forced. White could capture two black stones with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3, but that would just fall in with Black's sacrifice strategy. Black would force with 4 to 8, then capture four white stones with 10. This result would be bad for White.

White 37 is bad. White must attach at 1 in Dia. 4. If Black 2, White 3 is sente, so White can live with 5. If Black blocks at 5 with 2, White can play for a ko with White 4, Black 'a', White 'b'. Playing such a ko might be too risky for Black.

Figure 4 (141 - 188)

Capturing two stones in gote up to 45 is not enough. The game is virtually decided when Black blocks off the centre with 46 and 48.

White 67. If at 68, Black would block at 74 and White would have gained nothing.

White 85. There is no way for White to live at the top. If he played at 86 instead of 85, then after Black 'a', White 85, Black would have a clever answer at 'b'.




Figure 4 (141–188)

The late Segoe Kensaku, who helped edit a complete collection of the castle games, made the following comment on this game: 'Playing over this game, one feels that although Senchi's go is still immature, there is something magnificent and original about his methods and his ideas.'

White resigns after Black 188.

O-Senchi v. Mototora

White: Kono Mototora

Black: Yasui Senchi Senkaku

date: 17th November, 1783

This is also a castle game. Senchi's opponent, Kono Mototora, was another of the ten 'outsiders' permitted to play in the castle games during the Edo period. This game is a good example of O-Senchi's favourite moyo fighting.

Figure 1 (1 – 40)

Black 3, 5, 13. All high moves.

Black 19. Black 'a' concludes the joseki on the left, but since White would be able to enter the bottom left corner at 'b', Black finds this unsatisfactory. He prefers to set up a moyo with 19 and 21.

White 22 and 24 help Black, since Black 25 is a superb extension. Instead of 22, making a pincer at 'a' might be better, though that would permit Black to play the forcing sequence Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 34, Black 'f', White 'g'. Instead of playing this sequence, Black might prefer to jump to 'h' in response to White 'a'.

White 32. Jumping to 'i' would be better; if Black caps at 'j', White could then play 32.




Figure 1 (1 – 40)




Figure 2 (41 – 106)

Figure 2 (41 – 106)

Black 41. This forceful cut is not very aesthetic, but it is typical of Senchi's style. Actually, the fight here is not much of a success for Senchi, since Mototora ends up living inside his moyo. Senchi tries to take compensation by using his thickness to attack with 63 etc.

White 74 fills in one of his own liberties; White 84 instead is correct shape.

White 88. Pushing at 89 is more urgent; Black 88, White 'a', Black 92, White 'b' would follow and Black would not be able to build the large moyo that he does in the game.

White 104. White 'c' is more profitable, but White wants to keep Black short of liberties.




Figure 3 (107 – 170)

Figure 3 (107 – 170)

White 8, 10. Inexplicable – exchanging White 17 for Black 'a' first is essential.

White 14. If omitted, Black will kill White with 1 to 7 in Dia. 1. After 7, White 'a' is answered by Black 'b', while White 'c' is refuted by Black 'd'.

Black 39. A mistake, giving White the chance to play White 61, Black 43, White 44. The best Black can do in the corner if White omits 40 is to get a seki with Black 40, White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f', Black 'g', White 'h'. White 40 thus let slip a chance to upset Black's lead. In any case, if White is going to answer in the corner, White 'c' is worth 2½ points more than 40, as will be seen later.

White 46 and Black 47 are more or less miai.

Black 55 is a frightening move. If White intercepts with 1 in Dia. 2, Black forces with 2 to 12, then kills the centre group with 14.

Figure 4 (171 – 233)

Black 75 is a clever endgame move. White lets






Figure 4 (171 – 233)

83: right of 77; 84: takes; 103: connects (left of 99); 111: retakes; 125: connects (at 122)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Black get a seki up to 87, but he could get two eyes here by following Dia. 3 with 76. However, he would lose sente. Even with 78, White can still avoid seki by following Dia. 4, but letting Black capture a stone in sente would be too heavy a price to pay.

Black wins by 3 points.

O-Senchi v. Honinbo Retsugen

White: Yasui Senchi Senkaku


Black: Honinbo Retsugen

date: 11th April, 1786


Figure 1 (1 – 51)

Black 17. More peaceful would be Black 26, White 17, Black 'a'.


Black 27. The invasion is not urgent; Black 30 would be better.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 1 (1 - 51)






Figure 2 (52 - 100)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Black 43. If at 2 in Dia. 1, White 1 ends up exactly at the vital point after 3 to 9.

Figure 2 (52 - 100)

White 68 is a troublesome move. If Black answers at 1 in Dia. 2, White will play 2 and 4 and can aim at reducing Black to one eye later with 6 to 10.

Black 77. Simply jumping to 'a' seems better, as the 77-79 combination is a little unreasonable.





Figure 3 (101 - 160)



Dia. 5

9: connects ko; 17: connects

Black 81. Black 1 in Dia. 3 is better. Black would be able to seal White in up to 7.

Black 87. The ko in Dia. 4 would be unreasonable for Black.

Black 99. Black would like to play 100, but White 'b' would be severe.

Figure 3 (101 - 160)

Black 17, 19. Black is behind, so he is staking the game on this attempt to catch the white group to the left. Black 21 is surprising, as White 22 and 24 weaken Black, but Black must be afraid that White will settle his group by attaching at 21.

Black 37 is inexplicable. Black should fight with 1 in Dia. 5. The sequence to 17 is probable. Next, if White 'a', Black 'b' will be troublesome. This would be much better for Black than the sequence to 42 in the game.

Black 45. If at 46, White will capture the three stones on the side with 'a'.

White 48 and Black 49 are miai.

White 50. If at 'b', Black will extend at 'c' and White's position at the top will be too narrow.

Continued on page 44

